Militaries and Security Provisioning in Africa: an appreciation of Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda

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<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CNOOC</td>
<td>China National Offshore Oil Corporation</td>
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<td>COG</td>
<td>Center of Gravity</td>
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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East Africa Community</td>
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<td>East Africa Rifles</td>
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<td>Ex-FAR</td>
<td>Ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises</td>
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<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Forces Armees de la République Democratique du Congo</td>
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<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Forces for the Democratic Liberation of Rwanda</td>
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<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertacao de Moçambique</td>
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<td>FRONASA</td>
<td>Front for National Salvation</td>
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<td>GOC</td>
<td>General Officers Commanding</td>
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<td>IBEA</td>
<td>Imperial British East African Company</td>
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<td>ICGLR</td>
<td>International Conference for the Great Lakes Region</td>
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<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Courts Union</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter Governmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>LAPPSET</td>
<td>Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
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<td>MRC</td>
<td>Mombasa Republican Council</td>
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<td>Muslim Youth Center</td>
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<td>National Defence College</td>
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<td>NRM</td>
<td>National Resistance Movement</td>
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<td>RANU</td>
<td>Rwandese Alliance for National Unity</td>
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<td>RPA</td>
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<td>SDLF</td>
<td>Sabaoti Liberation Defense Force</td>
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<td>UNLA</td>
<td>Uganda National Liberation Army</td>
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<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Defense Forces</td>
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<td>WB</td>
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Résumé / Abstract

Cette note analyse la capacité de trois Etats de l’Afrique de l’Est à assurer la sécurité au plan national et régional. Il répond à trois principales questions ; sur les différents modes et systèmes sécuritaires des armées kenyanne, ougandaise et rwandaise, sur les capacités de ces Etats de l’Afrique de l’Est à maîtriser les importantes menaces internes et régionales auxquelles ils font face, sur les probables possibilités de maîtriser la géographie changeante, au fil du temps, de ces menaces.

Cette note souligne que le rôle en évolution, mais différent, des forces militaires dans la région s’inscrit dans des cultures militaires respectives c’est aussi en fonction des croyances et des comportements inspirés par la notion de volonté générale et d’esprit public. La volonté des élites dirigeantes de définir et de sécuriser les objets sécuritaires, au-delà des intérêts des régimes, facilite l’innovation dans la procédure sécuritaire, ce qui permet la connexion entre les cultures militaires et l’évolution de la pensée stratégique. De cette nouvelle donne résulte une flexibilité stratégique qui permet une marge de manœuvre plus grande pour maîtriser les menaces sécuritaires. Le contraire entraîne l’insécurité avec de multiples identités sous-cultures militaires négatives. Cette note essaye également de contextualiser les défis auxquels la sécurité de ces Etats fait face avec la découverte de ressources stratégiques entre d’une part la structure étatique verticale et d’une autre part les menaces asymétriques changeantes.

This paper attempts a capacity appreciation of three East African states in security provisioning at internal and regional level. It responds to three core questions; what underpins the differentiated modes and forms security provision by Kenyan, Ugandan and Rwandan militaries? Do these East African states have the capacity to contain the prevailing internal and regional threats? What are the likely options for containment of mutating geographies of threats over time in space?

The paper notes that the evolving but differentiated military role-play in the region is mediated by their respective military culture. This is a function of beliefs and attitudes inspired by the notion of the general will. The willingness of the ruling elite to define and secure objects of security beyond regime-centric interests anchors innovation in securitization, a process that underpins the nexus between military culture and strategic thought evolution. The resultant strategic flexibility allows the enhanced ability to contain security threats. The converse is the insecurity engendering multiple identities and negative military sub-cultures. The paper equally attempts to put into context challenges posed to these states’ security by discovery of strategic resources and state-centric vertical infrastructure at one level, and the mutating asymmetrical threats at another.
Introduction

This paper attempts a capacity appreciation of three East African states in security provisioning at internal and regional level. It responds to three core questions; what underpins the differentiated modes and forms security provision by Kenyan, Ugandan and Rwandan militaries? Do these East African states have the capacity to contain the prevailing internal and regional threats? What are the likely options for containment of mutating geopolities of threats over time in space? The paper notes that the evolving but differentiated military role-play in the region is mediated by their respective military culture. This is a function of beliefs and attitudes inspired by the notion of the general will. The willingness of the ruling elite to define and secure objects of security beyond regime-centric interests anchors innovation in securitization, a process that underpins the nexus between military culture and strategic thought evolution. The resultant strategic flexibility allows the enhanced ability to contain security threats.

The converse is the insecurity engendering multiple identities and negative military subcultures. These underpin reinvented ethnic warriors, predatory and bandit militias that anchor hard-core insecurities. The paper is organized around three core parts: The first anchors a brief history of the evolution of these militaries. Here, we relook at attempts at state reform in the case of Kenya and state de (re) construction in the case of Uganda and Rwanda. We shall seek to examine the impact this process had in shaping military culture. Part two recapitulates on the role-play of the military in relation to identified threats and existing organizational logic and capacity. It responds to this through a trifurcated logic. The third part recapitulates on evolution of threats using Buzan’s intensity of threat model, while anticipating strategic engagements of these militaries. The fourth recapitulates on the apparent dead capital and strategic imperative for stability in the region. Here, we will seek to examine innovative responses to regional security threats and the inevitable policy alternatives.

1 – State Forming. A Redundant Revisit

Ideally, military forming is defined by the conception of national interest, resultant objects of security to be secured and conceived threats to these objects. The foregoing in turn mediates the development, deployment and employment of the resultant military assets. Securitization as a process is geared towards enhancing capacity to protect the State’s triage of ideas, institution and the physical base. The result at an overt, objective sense level is manifested by absence of threats to values. In the subjective sense, it is that absence of fear that these values could be attacked. If conceived in a narrow-sense, the conception of security revolves around perspectives that see threats to revolve around enemy invasion and attempts to overthrow the regime. The military’s role here is set out to counter mainly conceived regime enemies in disregard of the internal vulnerabilities and threats. The broader conception draws a nexus between security and development. Both perspectives are shaped by and in turn shape military culture.

1 See Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962). P150
Military culture includes invented and learned ways of adapting to and containing threats facing a polity that have been transmitted across generations. It is a function of an accord between mission objectives and behaviour patterns. It is all about the type of training, command and control structures that exist, a factor that then produces values, norms and rules of conduct. Military culture influences attitudes towards preference for not only certain types of war, but also the ability to adopt and respond to innovations and threats. This is the end-state of strategy: That process of aligning means with objectives to achieve desired ends. This reality of the military culture, institution, and its ability to positively or negatively impact on the discourse mediates the civil-military relations, hence the differentiation of military cultures.

We can talk of the military culture as a discourse and the reality of the military institution. Both have a potential of transforming and mutating the society through effects on the military institution, its activities, the people it demobilizes and the imitations the society undertakes to reflect it. The discourse on military culture is about the military as imagined by the society including what is said about it and what it is supposed to be. It fits into what is best referred to as the ideal culture - culture as expressed in norms and values people claim to believe in. Animating discourses are colonial and post-colonial military formations that evolved as mirror images of organic militaries. Mirror image as opposed to organic militaries that emerge driven by internal state building logic are driven by the exclusive logic of ruling elite colonial or neo-colonial, and are core in the mediation of violence and resource extraction. Such a mirror image becomes in effect the reality of the military and culture.

Where discourses entail desires for conventional codes and standards for engendering professionalism, nationalism and patriotism as opposed to subjective ethnic, elite or religious interests, the resultant perfected reality of the military culture and institution will manifest enhanced capacity to deliver on its mission. This will include increased regard in society and role-play of the military as an institution for rallying up national unity. Converse particularistic discourses accord with mirror military institutions before transforming them into inverted mirror images of military institution and cultures. These in turn anchor extreme forms of insecurities spawned by state security agencies and non-state entities that appropriate these inverted cultures.

A perfected reality of military culture and institution can emerge consequent to constitutional changes anchored by alternative discourse. Here, the notion of the way things should be is informed by new orientations and expectations. The Constitution may for instance call for a re-alignment to recalibrate the military and other security organs to reflect the geographical and cultural traits of the state. This in turn impacts on recruitment and vertical mobility, command and control and the overall behaviour patterns including how a military institution views and sees itself. Other value shifts would include changes in procurement and management systems that are insecurity engendering such as corruption.

Equally, the reality of the military institution and culture can impact on the discourses of military culture to force the evolution of an alternative discourse. This can be the case

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3 We borrow this from –Cultural Model – The discourse and reality of War of Lynn J.A. However in stead of using it to explain the extreme realities of War, we build around it to elaborate on the existence of discourses of military and Military culture at one level and the existence of the reality of Military and actual culture. We presuppose the notion of positive and negative discourses and their correspond effects on the perfected reality. We equally presuppose the same with respect to the ability of reality of the military and culture to impact on and positively or negatively to impact on discourse, create alternative discourse that animates extreme realities or what this paper calls inverted multiple mirror images. See Lynn (2003).
where the military has undertaken security reforms informed by the general will, allowing it to undertake the role of state building. It is also possible for mirror image military and culture to transform positive discourses to generate an alternative negative discourse. The consequent alternative discourse has the potential of according with reality of military culture and institution to engender an extreme reality. This happens consequent to a convergence of the mirror image of the military culture as a reality, and the negative elite discourses. This anchors distorted and inverted mirror images of the military culture, other security institutions and non-state societal organizations that imitate formal military institutions and culture. Extreme Reality is a phenomenon of degeneration and informalization of the military and other security agencies.

Manifestations of this include, collapse of the normative realm, ethnicization of the institution and its instrumentalization for politics. This orientation animates the emergence of negative military sub-culture that soon permeates the society. These are rooted in the prevailing distance decay at economic, political, social and security levels within the society. As groups are left out of the mainstream due to political, economic and social marginalization, they opt to sustain their reproduction through alternative means that are inimical to the normative order. The danger for the state as an entity lies at the point at which sub-cultural manifestations inform groups that begin to resist the state’s monopoly over the instruments of violence. If this resistance takes refuge in the ethnic identity and a geographical orientation, the state finds its control of national spaces seriously undermined. Two effects can be discerned; the first is the tendency by groups to imitate the military culture and institutions. The second is the drift by the military and other security institutions from mirror image of military institutions towards distorted or inverted mirror images. For the former, there is a net effect of spawning the reinvention of tradition as a means of rationalizing actions that are inimical to the state’s well being characterized by imitations of values, drills, command and control structures, roles and functions.

The role of ideas in determining threats in space over time should in effect determine deployment and employment of the military in the context of the challenges of state building conceived here as, that process of enhancing capacity across the triage. The military as dead capital, whose value is yet to be exploited becomes a fundamental factor. State building is a response to organizational and infrastructural gaps at political, economic and social levels. The net effect can be grasped in terms of low value provisioning of the state and by inference the legitimacy deficit. This in turn animates insecurity dilemmas. Insecurity dilemmas here are essentially a function of a crisis state actors find themselves in, wherein they find themselves opting to deploy instruments of violence to consolidate their hold onto power, a process that conversely increases wide forms of resistance.

The net diminished stateness manifests itself by high levels of security distance decay. This can be conceived in administrative terms to manifest the crisis of ruling position and control in emergent un-administered spaces that are characterized by an apparent state abstinence or absence. These underpin private violence and expanding criminal gangs. Under economic decay, the dynamics of exclusion and inclusion increase characteristics of bandit economies and corruption. Under the regulatory decay, the weakening of formal legislative and regulatory frameworks leads to emergence of the

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4 Distance decay concept is borrowed from the first principle of Geography: the more apart two points are from each other, the more the distance decay
bandit law that regulates predatory spaces. This dynamic has an impact on the military culture, which shifts from security-provision to its reality as a domain for extraction.

The extreme reality of this begins to evolve with the military becoming a major actor in the process of state degeneration. The converse is the case where the state conceives the military as a critical instrument of power and attempts to re-underline it with the economic and political instruments to reduce the distance decay. Inability of the state to confer identity to citizens, in addition to limited capacity to tax and provision. Political will to increase capacity to provision as a means of increasing capacity in the human physical base and value addition in the material base of the state eventually leads to distance decay reduction with the stability and security emerging to enhance the state as a sovereign entity.

This dynamic is measured in terms of increasing stateness. Key characteristics here include; the increased territorialization of the government’s thought in spaces that orders the modes and forms within which sovereignty is felt. As Michael Dean notes, “new forms of practices of state that shape human conduct and whose purpose is geared towards working through the desires, the aspirations, the interests and the beliefs of the citizenry towards a definite but shifting end evolves.” With it is a resultant phenomenon that Foucault calls governmentality, which is about how specific forms of administering the economy and population are felt in space. The purpose of government as a component of securitization is about how men governed in their relations links imprecation with wealth, resources, means of subsistence, territories and how the actors maximize on qualities such as climate and other modes and forms of increasing biological productions.

Success here essentially leads to the emergence of different levels of the dimensions of government. Core in these are the four that Dean outlines - forms of visibility which are about how objects are pictured and constituted; the techne of government which entails means, mechanisms, tactics and technologies deployed for purposes of constituting authority and accomplishing rule. The third is the episteme of government. This is about forms of thought knowledge, expertise and calculations employed in governing in the development of form given to what is governable. The fourth is about forms of identification - here the government has to be concerned with how subjects are formed including agents and actors, in a bid to produce subjects that are governable.

The net effect is governmentalization, which is felt in terms of reduced distance decay and increased resource capacity of the state to respond to security challenges. Here, there is the increased sense of sovereignty manifested by high levels of capacity to impose order and stability given the apparent force to space ratio dynamics in space. It also leads to flexibility in operationalizing the principle of mass and economy of force. Our argument here is that the higher the capacity to legitimately assure stateness, the higher the flexibility in the application of mass and economy of force which manifests itself in the willingness of the state to positively evolve internal and regional capacity for securitization through the military. Stateness also engenders the need for external resource extractions. This in turn anchors the necessity for enhanced expeditionary component for both soft power and economic extraction purposes. Internal stability equally increases sensitivity towards regional insecurity and by inference appetite for

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5 See Dean M (1999), Governmentality (London Sage) 1999: 16
regional stability. This is not to argue that unstable states would not incline themselves to evolve some form of capacity for regional engagements. Where this is the case the capacity is limited to numbers. Engagements become a mode of exporting internal contradictions. The main objective here is to extract through peacekeeping operations. The overall behavior and the need to deploy are inherently determined by the absence of state building notion in the target state and the unwillingness of other actors to supply assets. However where engagement in regional securitization is driven by an objective appreciation of the consequences of the regional instability, the said expeditionary capacity is manifested both by quality and political will of the leadership. It is manifested by the activities involved and undertaken simultaneously as peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement activities, and regional security threat neutralization while retaining internal capacity to respond to military operations other than war.

2 – From Exclusion and Violence, Towards Military Culture of State Securitization

Contemporary military cultures are differentiated by specificities such as distanciation from colonial practices mediated by reforms or transformations, and conception of and use of military by political actors as a tool in securitization across five sectors; political, military, environmental, economic and societal sectors of security. The foregoing also informs its use at actor, institutional, state, regional and international levels.

2.1 – The Kenya Defense Forces (KDF)

Kenya Armed Forces currently known as Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) has its roots in the Kings African Rifles and prior to it the, the British East African Rifles. Its culture was informed by mirror images of military culture. Several factors underpin this. First is the rationality of Imperial British East African Company (IBEA) and the efforts of British officers and administrators to impose their will on locals. Second is the preference of armed Zanzibaris, Sudanese, Indians and ex-slaves and British officers to the exclusion of indigenous groups. Third is its narrow definition of objects of security to be the securitization of administrative depots, trade routes, market centres, stocks and staff.

The surrender of the royal charter by Sir William Mackinnon in 1895 to the British government saw the re-organization of these elements as 1000 strong East Africa Rifles (EAR). Of these, 350 were Sudanese remnants of the Egyptian force. The rest were mainly coastal Moslems. This disconnection while facilitating their ability to mediate violence and thus impose a foreign will enhanced their alienation while incubating their repressive culture.

Independence saw this culture reinvented and sustained, mediated by imperatives of regime consolidation and entrenchment. Race was replaced by ethnicity. This mediated size and role. The 2010 constitution saw the emergence of KDF. This was a reflection of constitutional reform discourse impact on the reality of the military culture in a bid to create a perfected military culture. Chapter fourteen of Kenya’s Constitution sets out rules of forming, development, deployment and employment of the military. The

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constitution equally outlines the objects of security while outlining the broad framework of command, control and vertical and horizontal structures of oversight.

Under the constitution, the internal and external roles of the military are mediated by section 14. This brings the institution under the oversight of the National Security Council, and Senate and the National Assembly. Prior to this, deployment was the prerogative of the president. This constrained its objective use to deploy in support of internal security organs. The constitution equally calls for the force structure and composition to reflect the sociological reality of the Kenyan state with emphasis on respect of human rights.

These demands complement earlier reforms initiated by General Tonje in the mid 1990’s. For Tonje, if the military had to support other instruments of power in the pursuit of their objectives, it had to be reconfigured. His conception of threats shifted, from the traditional inward looking small army geared towards regime protection. Kenya military began to think in terms of two wars and a half. The Military had to be ready if need be to fight two external wars while being able to contain an internal insurgency or any major political problem. The force was restructured around two Commands: Western and Eastern under two General Officers Commanding (GOC) of the rank of Major General. Land Forces constitute the core. It is supported by specialized combat support elements including air and naval components. Each Command is enabled by resources from service commanders to wage wars and contain disasters in their realms if need be. Currently, the Force averages 30,000. There was a doctrinal shift from the old fashioned positional theory towards manoeuvre theory. This advocates for conduct of war or operations, through achievement and maintenance of the initiative through manoeuvre, concentration of firepower and skilful maximization of terrain with a view to destroying or effectively neutralizing enemy’s centre of gravity. There has been a shift towards both physical and psychological dimensions of warfare with the aim of destroying enemy forces and resources as opposed to seizing and occupying terrain. This orientation played a key role in the capture of Kismayu.

This new disposition of the military implied changing the dominant culture of the military officer in Kenya. The emphasis here is on education with the aim of developing an officer cadre that was intellectually competent and abreast with emerging revolutions in military affairs through the grasp of technology. Believing that the Military needed a strong strategy orientation that was directly linked to the civilian institutions, Tonje was instrumental in the creation and consolidation of the National Defence College (NDC) as an institution for strategic learning.

Other changes facilitated institutionalization and predictability in the institution. Henceforth fixed years an officer would be expected to hold on to a rank before automatic retirement if a promotion to the next rank was not forthcoming. Term limits of four years, for service commanders. A Chief of General Staff was expected to serve a four-year term or retire at the age of 62 whichever came first. Service commanders on the other hand were expected to serve for a term of four years and retire at 58 whichever came first. This norming process has now been legalized after being discarded by the Kibaki regime.

The Military’s involvement in operations other than war at external and internal levels increased from the mid 1990s. For many years, Kenya was a leading contributor to
peacekeeping operations in and out of Africa. Its first mission was along Iran/Iraq border. Subsequent missions included, Zimbabwe 1979, the AU mission in Chad, the UN Mission to Namibia in 1989. In the 1990’s Kenya was involved in the UN mission to Sierra Leone and East Timor. Currently, it has 1681 men serving in the UN Missions mainly South Sudan. The state had never engaged in overt compact military operations in the region prior to its engagement into Somalia in October 2011. Consequent to disruptive attacks directed at its societal and economic sectors, Kenya sent an expeditionary force into Somalia with an objective of creating and extending a buffer zone within the Jubaland area neighboring its borders. The re-hatting of these troops under the African mission to Somalia saw their numbers grow to brigade plus size. An additional brigade is deployed in the rear along the Kenya-Somali border. Yet this has not blunted Al Shabaab’s infiltration.

At the internal level, the military’s roles have revolved around disaster response and management. Its outstanding operations include the reconstitution of the Mombasa-great lakes highway that had been cut off by a Tsunami floods in the 1990’s and the containment of highland malaria outbreak in the Western Region of Kisii. It equally played a prominent role in disaster management after the 1998 Bomb blast in Nairobi and Kikambala at the Coast in the process earning respect as an institution in the collective psychic of the State. The multi-party era has also seen the military engaged in containing criminal activities of organized militias such the Sabaoti Liberation Defense Force (SLDF) and the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). In the courses of these operations, they have been accused of human rights violations. A large part of these accusations revolve around internal security management including issues as basic as the type of dressing that makes it impossible for the citizens to distinguish the military from other paramilitary organs.

The effects of the increased distance decay in Kenya, has mediated the emergence of a large number of organized violent groups acting as alternative security providers. The net effect has been the emergence of organized and overtly armed groups, pseudo-militarized and ethno-regional gangs. The inability of the internal security organs to contain these and the unwillingness of state political actors to inventively use the military’s potential in security support and infrastructure development roles has created a dynamic in which its potential to deploy externally is increasingly becoming constrained. Underpinning this is, the narrow definition of the objects of security, which in effect has configured the military into a force for assuring mainly, regime consolidation and extraction from its more than $735 million annual budget. Despite its professional capacity and potential for state building role, the military has increasingly found itself confronted with a wide range of scandals revolving around procurement. This includes a Kshs 10 million contract awarded to an Israeli firm to refurbish and upgrade its fleet of armor scout cars. Instead the company installed engines that could not perform. A multi-billion tender for supply of armored personnel carriers was awarded to a south African firm leaving out other contenders.10

Kenya is equally constrained by the size of its military in relation to internal and regional security threats and the increasing needs defined by its geo-political position in the region. At internal level, politically instigated polarities will continue to pose a portent threat including the challenge of both use and role of the military. Equally critical are extreme levels of poverty and inequality. These in addition to militia and

10 Nairobi Law Monthly “Did Cartels win Fight for Kenya’s military forces cash stash?”
gang activities, and potential fall out from The Hague have implications on the military culture on Kenya’s consolidation.

2.2 – Uganda People’s Defense Forces (UPDF)

The UPDF and its forerunner, the National Resistance Army traces their origins to the decades of historical struggles against state violence in Uganda. The first cells of UPDF can be traced to the first batch of boys sent by Museveni under the auspices of Front for National Salvation (FRONASA), to train in FRELIMO controlled areas in 1976 in 1976. Other major struggles were to mediate Fronasa’s relation with the society, include the liberation war against Idi Amin 1979 before FRONASA was submerged in the new Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). This cell would reconstitute and re-emerge as the National Resistance Army (NRA) to wage a protracted war against Milton Obote’s regime. Guided by its methods of work and theory of its resistance, the NRA would effectively deconstruct and reconstruct the Ugandan state. On taking power, NRA would strive to implement its ten point program whose main focus was the Ugandan citizen as core object of security. NRM/A summarized its securitization ideas around its ten-point program. This in turn, informed the reconstitution of structures and institutions of the state and the role of the military in this.

Core here, is Museveni’s conception of the state, which puts emphasis on the need to have a strong well-trained, well-led, equipped and disciplined military capable of supporting other state institutions. To Museveni, this would provide security to the individual, the material and territorial base of the state. In all these processes, the NRA was at the core supplying the ideas, manpower and infrastructure. The political realm the NRA high command had played a major role in incubating and protecting the nascent political leadership. But the fact that the collapsed state had engendered the militarization of the society implied that its desire for security, economic and political institutions would be tested. The options around this entailed the operationalization of the ideology of a broad based political security system. This process in effect constituted the first attempts at security-centered transformation. It implied absorption of various armed functions into NRA subsequent to their retraining and reorganization. The net value in this was an expanded political legitimacy demilitarization of society that brought to an end the apparent oligopolies of violence in favor of state monopoly of violence. There were also other implications that would shape the military henceforth. The first was the expanded size of the military and its resultant cost implications. Second were counter revolutionary groups that emerged sustained by some of the neighboring states such as the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), the west Nile Bank Front (WNFB) and the Allied Democratic Front (ADF). Third were the desertions that eventually led to the creation of the RPA. Parallel to these, were institutionalization attempts anchored by the repeal of the 1969 Armed forces Act and the legalization of the NRA as the national army under the legal notice no 1 of 1986. There was equally the NRA statute enacted with an emphasis on creating a pro-people military that respected human rights. The 1996 constitution affirmed the new modes of governing society and the military. It also changed its name to UPDF.

Between 1992 and 1994, under pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB), the Force was downsized leading to demobilization of thousands of soldiers. Unfortunately, the emphasis was more on economic imperatives of cost, rather than the appreciation of the broad objects of security. Little attempt was made to create requisite social and economic infrastructure that could absorb and
cushion this massive infusion into society of a large mass of militarized elements. The net consequence was increased armed criminal activities. The impact was felt at the level of the denigration of the core achievements of the UPDF in engendering security and reactivating the economy. The government quickly militarized the response to quickly contain this crisis of urban violence. Between 2000 and 2004, the military undertook a wide range of transformations, aimed at enhance capacity and efficiency in the delivery of its mandate of securitizing the state.

Act of Parliament established a National Security Council for purposes of coordinating national security institutions and activities. It was followed by the 2001, UPDF reform program and the 2002 defense bill which anchored the review, regulation of UPDF organs, structures, welfare and deployment outside the state. The Bill in effect defined the broad security object of security; by defining National Security as freedom from fear, intimidation and other pressures, threats, real or potential from whatever source that would undermine the basic rights, welfare and property of the people of Uganda, the territorial integrity of the state, or proper functioning of the system of Government11. UPDF was tasked with the responsibility of assuring this internally and externally. Here a link between security and development was evolved. The core thinking here is that failure to securitize development especially human and material components is likely to engender costly damages. It could equally lead to disruption and diversion of resources.

UPDF is tasked with the responsibility of assuring societal functionality through justice, freedom, democracy and respect of human rights, participation of Ugandans in their bid to access education, health and shelter. It is expected to assure sovereignty by evolving capacity to defend the state from internal and external threats. The foregoing sets out a clear desire to evolve a trinity of the people, their government and their military to assure state security. Emphasis is on the nexus between threats and the elements of force development, deployment and employment. Critical here is geography, which underpins some of the contemporary threats Uganda experiences. Uganda has a total of 241,038 square Kilometers. Of these, land area accounts for 197,100 sq. km compared to 43, 938 Sq km of water. Total frontier is 2698 km (DRC 765 kmº, Kenya 933 km, Rwanda 169 km, Southern Sudan 435, Tanzania 396 kmº.

In addition to this, Uganda has to structure its force disposition to reckon with its shallow strategic depth of ratio of 93 sq km to every kilometer of its borders. This dynamic reduces its defensive options in the event of external attacks while increasing extent of damage to the triage of security. Her borders anchor current threats such as the ADF and the LRA now based in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). The LRA had engendered mass displacements and destabilization in its northern districts. To the north-east are insecurity challenges engendered by armed Karamojong pastoralists. Her porous borders have also facilitated terrorist activities. These threats continue to have the potential of converging with internal vulnerabilities such as poverty and age-old fractious fault-lines revolving around sectarianism and ethnicity. While external threats diminished with the defeat and expulsion of LRA from South Sudan and the latter’s independence, the potential of the return of the former remains due to resupply by the government of Northern Sudan.

Uganda’s link to Kenya is defined not only by their lengthy border alone, but also their insecurity engendering mutual dependency. For many years, this was shaped by infrastructure and commerce. The discovery of energy resources in both states and Tanzania is increasingly becoming a game changer with a potential insecurity enhancing logic if not handled in region-centric security enhancing fashion. Indeed, the strategic value of the resultant infrastructure and the need to secure it will reconfigure armed forces in the region. Currently, Uganda has to constantly watch out on what is happening to its Eastern borders as a result of this geopolitical salience. The reality of a weak DRC and the resultant distance decay has provided the ADF a large terrain and resources to exploit over time. Gradually the group has reconstituted from 400 to over 1000. Its disruptive capacity is evident in its ability to engage Congolese armed forces (Forces Armees de la Republic Democratique du Congo - FARDC) and displace more than 60,000 Congolese into Uganda since July this year. Unlike state enabled LRA terrorism, ADF is undergoing a mutation. This is apparent with its attempt to expand and control territory thus increasing its ability to train and deploy terrorist as it did in the 1990s. ADF’s alliance with Al Shabaab was anticipated by the Ugandan Government, given the historical links it has maintained with Al Qaeda. The said links allowed it to send recruits for training. The fact that many of these are from Eastern Uganda is a cause for worry to Uganda. Underlying this is the fact that, it enhances possibilities of opening a front in the east close to the strategic land and maritime lines of communication from Kenya and Tanzania that also link Southern Sudan. It is part of this consideration of potential threats from ADF and its global alliances that UPDF is in Somalia.

UPDF is organized around 5 infantry divisions backed by a brigade size special forces, combat support; air and marine components, combat service support. UPDF complement is estimated at 55,000 officers and men. Without a formal reserve force, Uganda relies on auxiliary elements of home guards and local defense units that are operational in all districts. Uganda equally had organized local security structures known as the resistance councils with roots in the NRA resistance struggle. In effect, the aim has been to create a force capability of dealing with both internal and external threats. The latter have called for expeditionary capacity. Here challenges continue to revolve around mobility, the need for timely deployment, command Control and information and maritime capability. While improvements have been done, constraints remain especially at the levels of management and welfare. The Force is still plagued by corruption and command inadequacies. The latter underpin the loss of several helicopter assets and crew on its way to Somalia, a factor that resulted in the dismissal of the top command in the air force.

The desire to enhance capacity to defend Uganda’s regional interest including infrastructure, common resources such as the Nile, lake victoria and discovered oil resources has animated the need to develop air combat capability and a trained ground combat component. Notably the Air force spent $ 700 million to acquire fighter jets. Among the assets it currently has include Russian made SU-30mk and Helicopter gunships

12. The fighters have transformed the Ugandan Air force into arguably one of the best in the region. This ability is apparent in its current deployments internally and at an expeditionary level. Compared to other states in the East African Community (EAC), Uganda has a division plus of its units on mission. At least 8000 of these are

12 Interview with a Senior Security Officer. Kampala - July 2011. See also Onyango Obbo. C. In East Africa , a silent drama is unfolding and no one is paying attention . East African may 2, 2022
based in Somalia where they played a critical role together with Burundian component to expel Al Shabaab from Mogadishu. There is an estimated brigade minus in CAR on counter LRA mission, and several Battalions in Southern Sudan. Domestically, there are units deployed in Karamoja on rustling, disarmament and securitization operations against Karamojong Ugandans and Pokot raiders from Kenya. Several others from the third division and fifth divisions are deployed along the DRC borders to counter ADF and secure the oil installations.

Despite this extensive deployment, several units remain on standby to help in the process of internal security operations in urban areas. Other operations that illustrate its ability to adopt to challenges include its use of traditional methods of transport that saw its troop operate over large swaths of territory in DRC with less logistical enablers. Yet it is this mission that later blurred its reputation, probity and competence. This ranged from accusations of illegal extraction by some of its senior officers and worse still predatory extraction by some of its senior officers in manipulating numbers while diverting resources, a process that contributed to humiliating performances in Kisangani and a prolonged insurgency in northern Uganda. To the extent that Museveni remains in power, UPDF will continue to play a core role in regional stabilization missions.

### 2.3 – Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF)

Identification of the correct idea of and purpose of the state combines with political will to inform the military culture that continues to shape Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF). Its predecessor, the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) was born out of the objective necessity of assuring security of a large number of Rwandese normalized as refugees. The commitment to reverse this situation saw thousands of Rwandese get mobilized under the auspices of RANU. Many of them flocked into the National Resistance Army animated by Pan Africanist spirit. Many more followed spawned by the instinct to survive repression from both Obote and Habyarimana. Numbers increased as when it was appreciated that the route to ending refugee status was through the broad NRA struggles. Acquisition of military science and leadership skills underpinned the decision to launch their struggle under the Rwanda Patriotic Army on the first of October 1990. Challenges such as the loss of its top leadership, repression, politicized identity polarization, poverty and marginalization determined its mission of state de(re)construction.

The subsequent struggle affirmed RPA's role as a core actor in the securitization process in Rwanda. Underpinning this was failure of the former Rwandan state to enforce its part of the social contract to protect its physical base and instead mobilized its instruments of power to the elite part of its population. RPA sought to counter this and advanced to take power only to find its role transformed into a critical actor with a mission of reconstituting the triage of the state.

Core here was the human component of the physical base. The imperative here was the duality of insecurity. This called for the need to provide security internally to the displaced and returnees while seeking to contain external threats from the genocide perpetrators. Complementing this was the need to avoid the phenomenon of militarized refugees by encouraging return of thousands of Rwandese that had run to Zaire. The reality of institutional and organization vacuum imposed on RPA the challenge of converting its military capital into economic, administrative and social infrastructure.
Insurgency in the ancienne régime’s power base animated the need for RPA to engender integration in the military. This was imperative if internal security critical to state re-constitution was to be assured. It was core to the process of transforming the apparent oligopoly of violence into a monopoly of violence. More than 20,000 ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises (Ex-FAR) were reintegrated. Security had been at the core of state collapse, it had to be at the center of its reconstitution. Critical here was the issue of institutional governance. RPA’s legitimacy was going to depend not only on security provisioning but also how it would construct the institutions to demonstrate inclusion.

At internal security level, the Rwandan National police force was constituted with the elements from the RPA constituting the nucleus. They were complemented by the gendarmerie component of the former ministry of defense, Judicial Police of the ministry of justice, local defense elements and citizen-based voluntary units that carried outright patrols. Also reconstituted was the national security intelligence service. This military origins, and the flexibility that has allowed military officers to be posted to the police have helped to retain a close relationship when it comes to securing the state internally. Currently, internal security is enhanced by the operationalization of fusion centers that vertically cut across the entire levels of state administrative units. These consist of military, police and intelligence. They have roles of coordinating and responding to security jointly with police as the lead agency. This cooperation has eliminated tensions that characterize police-military relations in many African states. The process has engendered the logic of security capacity and flexibility to roll forward or inwards in a bid to provide security. For instance, it is easy for internal units to move forward to support military as it engages in external threat containment and vice versa for the military to constantly avail support to internal security operations. The Police in this sense retain tactical superiority in terms of among others, force to space ratios.

The Weberian logic that conceives the state in terms of monopoly over instruments of violence has been achieved through a cultural transformation whose roots are in RDF revolutionary background. The military and police have sought to maintain strong police–military-civil relations. Core here are issues of disciple, corruption, command and control, unity of command and morale. Rwanda’s capacity to engender security is equally predicated in the flexibility of mind demonstrated by the leadership. This allows the spirit of innovation to continue prevailing. For instance, in a bid to respond to social economic needs of its soldiers, the leadership initiated a framework for collective saving structured around salary scales. This created the Credit and Savings Scheme (CSS). This system acts both as a cooperative and savings bank. It allows RDF and police members to borrow capital for self-development. Its role in state securitization, reconstitution and social integration was apparent in responses to insurgencies in the Northern Provinces and operations in DRC. For instance, it created resource accumulation for thousands of reintegrated soldiers of the ex-FAR. On return, these troops were not only able to demystify the narratives about Tutsi eliminations, but also to decent houses while starting business ventures for their spouses. It is this stakeholder mentality that turned negatively against the Forces for the Democratic Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) resulting in the uprooting of their local cell. This constitutes the micro-economic mode of counter insurgency.

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The scheme’s role was expanded into an institution for mediating human and state security in response to challenges of armed combatants returning from exile and those demobilized. Its role included management of their resources. All those who sought reintegration and later demobilization had their accounts with CSS across the state close to their homes. Together with Demobilization and Reintegration commission, CSS is able to dispose funds and knowledge for management of resources not only for men leaving Police and military but also reintegrated ex-combatants. Over time, it pioneered the establishment of dimensions of government. Through it, the state has been able to picture and constitute combatants both serving and demobilized in effect establishing forms of visibility. Through the structures and ability to provision values it established tactics, and technologies of constituting authority through the social and economic sectors. As an episteme, the government has evolved knowledge and expertise and critical calculations of assuring integration and unification of purpose with less cost of former adversaries. Through it, these militarized actors can be identified and formed in a manner that allows the state to monitor and control them through their self-interest. In the process it has helped to prevent recidivism while assuring security.

This apparent distance decay reduction at political, security, economic and social levels is not confined to the military alone. On the contrary, the apparent ability of RDF to securitize Rwanda is anchored in the ability of the leadership to deploy ideas to evolve not only discourses, but also policy frameworks that seek to reduce distance decay. These ideas frame and shape institutions and the purpose for which they are set up that is the securitization of the physical base. At the political level, the state continues to pursue the logic of broad-based inclusion especially at the level of participation. Constitutional requirements demand that parties are inclusive to all groups and identities. No party can have more than half of cabinet slots victory, elections notwithstanding. In administrative terms, emphasis has committed itself to decentralization with more activities and services being delivered at the districts. The object here is to have these decentralized even further to the local level. The net effect is that the administrative distance decay that engenders the crisis of rule imposition and control is reduced. There is no gap to allow none state actors to organize against it and the population.

At the economic levels, the emphasis on education improvement, agriculture, maximization of information and technology, and improvement of communication infrastructure has combined with decentralization to avail capital for development. Farmers have continued to be organized and availed infrastructure and security enabling them to improve their lot. This is apparent in the ancienne regime’s bastion. This has increased economic inclusion from below increasing rationalities of banking and with it, the logic of security control while diminishing predation. It is at the social level securitization that RDF’s integration and legitimacy has been consolidated. For Rwanda, security is conceived in broad terms to include societal, economic, political, military and environmental sectors. The assumption here is that the military is there to secure the entire physical base: the individual, material and territory. The internal dynamic of this has been conceived in reducing the insecurity costs to the state in economic and security terms occasioned by poor health, housing and poverty. The state

16 On Agricultural transformations in Rwanda, See Booth David and Goloba Mutebi F: “Policy for Agriculture and Horticulture in Rwanda: A different Political Economy”, Paper Produced as part of the Political Economy of Agricultural policy in Africa (PEAPA) Working paper No. 038
set up a health insurance scheme that has helped to increase access to facilities and doctors across the entire state. Any Rwandese can access health in military and public facilities. Through the police and Army weeks, Rwandans are accessed medical services for free. More critical, all expectant mothers have to deliver from recognized health facilities. This process allows the state to evolve capacity to accumulate and manage information on the individual from birth to death. Under the law that interdicts poor housing, the military “invaded” villages to help constructed iron sheeted houses across the entire state.

The net effect is that the process of governing in a Fauchaultian sense to mean men in their relations, links and imprecation with wealth, resources, means of subsistence and territory with respect to climate, is fast evolving. They are increasingly rendering government visible. The net effect is that they have increasingly created an aura of security while creating a surplus of security assets.

Rwanda is in a position to assure its internal security while retaining a surplus for peacekeeping operations. This is becoming an alternative source for military and state capacity building, besides also engendering resource extraction. RDF force is estimated to be 60,000 infantry with specialized combat support units. It has evolved a nascent air force whose roots were in voluntary contributory logic of all RDF members. This saw them acquire their first helicopters. Rwanda is currently contributing 4208 troops to UN-missions in Darfur and South Sudan. 25 % of these units are from its reserve force that it is in the process of constituting. The military has equally set up an enterprise component known as horizon which engages in engineering activities from road, to building, and mechanical. Not only is this helping in cost cutting but also in resource organization, transformation and extraction. Despite the foregoing, Rwanda has continued to experience threats from FDLR. While the latter has limited military capacity to threaten the state, its threat has been increasing as the state has sort consolidation and stability. While for long it has been located in the psychological realms, in terms of terrorism that in a way seeks to undermine the state’s legitimacy predicated on ability to provide security, of late, it has moved forward and attempted to attack the emerging critical tourism sector in Musanze. Estimated to average 4650 men FDLR’s infiltration has manifested itself in the hauling of hand grenades at public sites and attacks on RPA’s positions. Two such incursions occurred on 27th November 2012 against Muti, Kabuhanga and Bugeshi sectors of Rubavu district and on 12 December 2012 on Kazi Village Musanze district. The response by the state has included extended vigilance that has included overt deployment of military and security agents to supplement the Police. A limited threat is manifested by two former senior officers, Gen. Kayumba Nyamwansa and Patrick Karegaya. However their efforts to attract traction within the ranks of RDF, have so far failed.

With a total land area of 26, 358 km, land area of 24,668 sq. km and 1670 sq. km of water mass, Rwanda has to secure its borders with Burundi (290km), Tanzania (217 km), DRC (217 km) and Uganda (169km). In effect, like Uganda, Rwanda has serious geo-political insecurity potential engendered by its low strategic depth. Security response logic has been to reduce internal vulnerabilities while enhancing expeditionary capacity. The broad long-term objective is to transform Rwanda into a regional hub in terms of Information Communication Technology (ICT) and industry. The evolution of a regional security dependence on Rwanda, if complemented with Rwanda’s defense on the region in terms of markets and infrastructure should enhance internal and regional security.
3 – **Challenges Regional Insecurity Convergences**

The ability of Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda to provision security values is likely to be tested by geo-strategic infrastructure dynamics and asymmetrical contestations.

### 3.1 – Resource Discoveries, Vertical Infrastructures and Convergences of New Conflicts

A key factor in the emerging security dynamics in the East African region is the convergence between geographies of state design and the natural need for strategic outlets. Underlying this, are the new discoveries of game changing strategic resources. These are increasingly forcing a geo-strategic rethink of existing port, rail, pipeline and refinery infrastructure for their delivery to the Sea and Oceanfront. The imperative here is for landlocked states to seek state-centric security generating infrastructural flexibility and state consolidation. This policy orientation process directed at status quo states that either seek to main their current values or increase them such as Kenya, Tanzania and Djibouti is best described as regional revisionism.

Conflicts are inherent in the Mackindian logic that is driving the current vertical closing up of spaces in the Horn and Great lakes regions. The net result is likely to be insecurity and/or security dilemmas as each state’s actions are (mis)-interpreted as hostile action necessitating opposite and equal responses. Mistrust, lack of information, regional anarchy and availability of external capital is likely to animate power struggles as value addition on strategic resources engenders the need to build requisite military assets for securitization of a wide range of referent objects. Geography will essentially mediate political interactions among states affirming the link and causal relationship between political power and geographical space.

Attempts at constructing mega infrastructure with a state-centric logic is in effect likely to provide revisionist states the strategic flexibility to break out of their dependency while increasing their ability to bargain in the process increasing the felt sense of vulnerability among some seafront states. A case in question is that of Ethiopia and Eritrea. The former abandoned Assab and Massawa ports for the Djibouti port, which currently accounts for 90% of its goods. Ethiopia’s other alternative outlets now include Somaliland port of Berbera, Port Sudan and Mombasa at 1900 km, and 2067 km respectively. Djibouti and North Sudan remain uncomfortable with the projected Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPPSET). The same underpins the current tensions between Southern Sudan and the North and the attempts of the former to increase its security flexibility by seeking multiple alternative routes through Tanga, Djibouti and Lamu in Kenya.

Attempts by Kenya to converge the processing of Ugandan and Tanzanian oil and gas in Kenya were rejected by the two states. Uganda sought to construct a new oil refinery with a production capacity of 4000 bpd in a bid to take advantage of the estimated 200,000 Bpd productions by 2015. This push is underpinned by the drive for energy security to assuage the 11000 bpd of fuel consumed or 580,000 cubic meters per year consumed in Uganda. It also seeks the regional market especially Kenya’s 55,000bpd consumption quantity in addition to Rwanda, Burundi, Eastern DR and South Sudan. To this extend, it seeks to have Tallow and Heritage companies built a US$ 2 billion

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pipeline to Mombasa for export purpose. This orientation seems to engender several insecurity fears inherent in the apparent dependence Kenya has on the Ugandan market and by inference Rwanda, Burundi and Eastern Congo. Uganda remains a leading consumer of Kenya’s oil at 30% of all exports. The imagination here is that any unilateral exit from this “capture” is likely to affect Kenya negatively. From the loose tax revenues accrued from profits to Kenya pipeline, road transport companies, import export firms to exports of oil products. For Kenya, threats also lie in the imagined possibility of a successful decoupling of Rwanda, Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from her energy infrastructure.

Another imagined threat for Kenya has been Uganda’s search for strategic flexibility with respect to road and rail network through a joint project with Tanzania to build a rail, pipeline and road linking the port of Tanga to port bell on lake victoria through Arusha, Musoma, Kampala adding another insecurity. China Civil Engineering Corporation is slated to complete the project feasibility study in 2012. The projected estimated to cost US $3billion includes an 880 km rail, Mwambani port in Tanga, Port at Fort Bell and, Musoma docks. There will be rail connections to Tororo and all the way to Gulu 600 km way before connecting to Juba through a 250 km line and an additional 550 km line to Wau in Southern Sudan. Uganda set herself to rehabilitate MV Pamba and MV Kaawa ferries to facilitate movement on Lake Victoria between Mwanza and Fort Bell. John Byabagambi, the Ugandan Minister for Works also indicated Uganda’s intention to break out of what he considered “ransom” by problems in Mombasa noting, “we are developing the southern route as an alternative”. This 2000 km route starts at Dar-es-Salaam, passing through Morogoro, Dodoma, Mayoni, Singida via Mutukula and Masaka and involves Rwanda, Burundi too. It is notable that Uganda accounts for 76% of total cargo handled in Mombasa. Uganda also sought plans to setup a joint refinery to produce South Sudan oil.

Tanzania seeks to put up a 1,150 Km pipeline from Dar-es-Salaam to Mwanza to provide Uganda with an alternative outlet\textsuperscript{19}. Tanzania equally signed an agreement with Rwanda and Burundi for the Construction of a railway from Bagamoyo through central Tanzania beginning from 2014 at the cost of $4.7b\textsuperscript{20}. Kenya on her part has embarked on a new transport corridor from Lamu. It will have connections to Addis Ababa and Juba from Isiolo junction. China agreed to fund the construction of facilities that include rail, road, pipelines, port and refinery\textsuperscript{21}. There is the South Sudan LAPSET corridor’s 1,250km rail that runs from Lamu, through Garrisa Kula Mawe, Isiolo Lodwar, Lokichokio, 460 km Ethiopia LAPSET from Isiolo, Marsabit and Moyale. The total dry cargo is envisaged at 13.5 million tons in 2020 and 23.9 million in 2030. The railway construction is expected to take three years to complete by 2016. Expected to haul goods from South Sudan and Ethiopia estimated 3million tons for imports and 4.7 million for export by 2020. The rail is expected to cost US $7,100 million. The total cost construction of the road networks is estimated at US $1.4 billion. the construction of Crude oil and product oil Pipeline estimated to costs US $3,950. (Lamu Isiolo (540km) US$1,480 million Isiolo-Nkodok (780km US $41,240, and port area US$ 572. Construction of product oil pipeline is US$ 885 million - Isiolo-Lamu US$ 572m, Isiolo Moyale (450 Km) US $ 314m\textsuperscript{22}.

\textsuperscript{19} See The East African business January 9/5/2012
\textsuperscript{20} See The East African business January 9/5/2012
\textsuperscript{21} See Raila Leads Rush for Southern Sudan Oil. The Standard 19 October 2009p1
\textsuperscript{22} See LAPSET CORRIDOR AND NEW LAMU PORT. Feasibility Study and Master Plan Development Plan. Final FS and MP Report (Vol 111)
It is estimated that Kenya could earn as much as 7.5 billion shillings annually to transport 2.5 million tones of South Sudan’s oil. The salience of this corridor increased with the breakout of conflicts between the two Sudan’s. Indeed once the project was initiated by presidents of Ethiopia, South Sudan and Kenya, North Sudan send a protest note to Kenya accusing it of endangering her national security and undermining regional security. The discovery of oil in Turkana has animated further imaginations about this corridor’s oil pipeline, railway, roads, sea and airports and refinery. This was to have a connection to Uganda even though the latter has shown little interest in the project.

Motivated partly by inefficiencies in Mombasa port and the post election chaos in Kenya, Rwanda and, Burundi seek to increase their flexibility through negotiations with Tanzania to set up a rail link through central Tanzania in to Bagamoyo. This seems to flow in the Tanzanian elite thinking that has sought to decouple these states from Mombasa. A central line through Tabora to Uganda essentially revives the classical route used by Wanyamwezi traders into the old Buganda kingdom. It is notable that in line with its logic of maintaining its traditional status quo, Kenya has evolved plans to establish a faster rail network at a cost of Ksh 320 billion (US $4billion) to cover 1300km from Mombasa to Malaba in effect targeting the Great lakes. To the extent to which these approaches are state-centric, they are likely to underpin apparent geopolitical tension among these states.

This is already apparent in the intra-East African community relations. Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda have for instance opted to push forward integration activities seemingly leaving behind both Tanzania and Burundi. In two strategic meeting held in Kampala and Mombasa decisions were taken to allocate the three states leading roles in select sectors critical to integration such as infrastructure. This process seems to be driven by actor interest convergence. Underlying this are two factors. The first is Tanzanian policy positions on the Rwanda, Uganda DRC triad. Her positions including calls on Rwanda and Uganda to hold talks with their armed opponents on one side and opting to send in an intervention component in the Kivu in contrast to the ICGLR position favoring dialogue has not helped. This has been followed up by expulsion of many people of Rwandan origin from Tanzanian and the disappearance of FDLR’s second in Command (2 IC) in Tanzania. The apparent close relations between Tanzania and USA have not been taken kindly in Kenya given the snap the US President gave to the state due to the ongoing Hague process. In an apparent snap to Tanzania, the three states have forged meetings without bothering to invite the former. These dynamics taking place in the context of low levels of information, and trust are (mis)interpreted as hostile. It will not be surprising to see opposite and equal responses.

The foregoing is likely to converge with value addition on strategic resources to animate the built up of requisite military assets for securitizing the resultant range of referent objects. While geography mediates security dilemmas, it is the logic of locking states with differentiated endowments within a given spatial setting that tends to impact greatly on regional security dynamics. Underlying this is the net impact it has in sharpening tensions around regional boundaries and forms of engagements. In the process, it mediates patterns of amity and enmity dynamics. The durability here is a function of the extent to which states go out to enhance interdependent engagements that increase mutual sensitivity and costliness of military actions. Seen in the context of

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23 See Njogopa G: Integration: We Will Not Be bulldozed, says Sitta. The Citizen, Thursday.19 September 2013p1-2
24 Apparently abducted by unknown Persons
a triadic system of the GLR, the Horn and the Indian Ocean, security relations may be impacted upon.

Uganda, Ethiopia and South Sudan are likely to be key determinants of interstate relations to the extend of playing Kenya, Tanzania and Djibouti against each other if they sustain stability anchored on horizontal resource value addition. Their strategic edge is likely to be enhanced if they evolve to consolidate multiple exit infrastructures to the oceans/seas. It is this that will provide them with strategic flexibility. Given the likely sub-optimal behavior among status quo states, gains from water front connecting infrastructure will be minimal. Kenya’s geo-political position as a potential bridgehead for three sub-systems is likely to be contested by Tanzania and Djibouti. Tanzania’s immediate geo-strategic imperative is to create alternative tri-system penetration by reviving the central corridor through Bagamoyo. There are also Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga options. Reactivation of Tazara should also give it a reach to the Southern and South Western sub-system. Reviving the three central axes should access her to central Great lakes region and the Sudan section of the Horn of Africa. Here, common fears about Kenya, calls for a natural convergence with Uganda. This state-centric option will be highly sub-optimal. Tanzania’s tactical actions may be read and construed to imply the constraining of integration process in East Africa Community. They main game plan would have to revolve around a covert need to desire for stability in Uganda to enable her to act as a counterpoise to Kenya.

The strategic advantage, Kenya and Tanzania seek to have by accessing the core of the pivot triangle25 (DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Southern Sudan) through construction of continental infrastructural arteries and port sourcing points, is thus likely to be short term and indeed insecurity enhancing to the extend that it remains state-centric in nature. Under-laying this, are apparent tensions that are likely to engender balance of power rivalries and by inference security complexes. States here will have to anticipate the emergence of shatter-belts, where their interests are likely to converge leading to possible clashes. Such crush points include the Kivu triangles, KAPOTOTURM26, Lake Victoria, the Triangle in zone Five27, the Jubaland corridor and, the Indian Ocean. It is notable that geography locates Kenya at the epicenter of the sub-systems, a factor that is likely to see her get affected more by these threats. The Jubaland corridor and the Indian Ocean are interesting. This is given the fact that, their salience as shatter belts with both regional and global geo-political and economic implications is already being felt. Ethiopia for instance has deep misgivings about what it perceives to be Kenya’s intensions in the Juba valley - (a space initially administered together with Kenya protectorate by the British) and the implications this has on its Somali inhabited Orgaden. The province is core to Ethiopia’s access to the sea through Somali –land. Current and long-term threats to LAPSET corridor will mediate Kenya’s military disposition. It will engender re-orientation over development, deployment and employment of its instruments of power. Ethiopia’s concerns for the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the need to keep a close eye on the dynamics around this Valley in turn inclines her interest in what it considers as the Oromo corridor. While Uganda would

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26 Karamajong, Pokot, Toposa, Turkana, Merile - heavily armed pastoralist groups locked within an apparent insecurity system in the Eastern African region.

cast a wider regional geo-political appreciation of maritime threats animated by global Islamists, Eritrea will continue to view the Somali problems as an opportunity to hurt Ethiopia and to increase the costs of its closed space.

Technology will also play a critical role in inter state relations given its impacts on geography. Fundamental here, is the need to secure interests in the shatter felts and infrastructure. Critical here will be its impact on warfare. The last conflicts in the GLR were conducted mainly within the second dimensions of war. Of late, there is a remarkable progression in the subsequent conflicts such as the Ethiopia-Eritrea War, Ethiopia – Islamic Courts Union (ICU) encounters in Somalia and the current KDF push against the Al Shabaab that point to the use of airborne assets. The Pivot triangle with its resource endowments may be announcing the arrival of Giulio Douhet et al and their air power especially its use as an offensive weapon to shatter morale of populations while destroying enemy defenses including industrial infrastructure to end the wars quickly.

The region has to brace itself for a revival of an arms race, security and insecurity dilemmas as states seek to produce a strategic balance as a neutralized power while attempting to project military power. This situation existed in the eighties between Kenya and Tanzania. For instance, in a bid to counter Kenya’s aerial superiority, Tanzania invested in air defense systems especially at Longido. It also put up an entire division on its Northern borders to counter any prospective invasion from Kenya. States like Kenya and Uganda point to genuine threats such as international and regional terrorism. Uganda has also pointed to threats from the regime in north Sudan and the need to protect its strategic resources including water. Yet this does not minimize the apparent notion of fear driven security dilemma.

For a period of time, Kenya sought to neutralize the advantage her neighbors had in numbers by investing in her Air force. However by the end of 2010, neglect and internal self-cannibalization had placed the force on rocks. At one point there were only three fighter pilots flying several combat aircrafts. Availabilities of capital from oil resources have seen Uganda begin to invest seriously in this realm. The expected rebuilding of the Kenya Air force and Ethiopian and Ugandan Air force points to rise of airpower in the Pivot Triangle. In both cases of the East African Community (EAC) and of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Uganda will continue to stands out as the balancer of power between two status quo ocean front states with respect to the former and in the case of a revisionist and a Sea front state in the case of the latter. This leaves out Tanzania and Rwanda who may naturally build up air defense systems. Kenya’s decision to transform Kisumu Airport into an international hub in addition to Wajir, Moi International in Eldoret, Lokichoggio, Isiolo and Mombasa swing advantages to her for some foreseeable future only undermined by lack of internal cohesion and political will. Dynamics like the potential conversion of Kisumu, as a forward operational base has the potential of engendering the militarization of lake victoria by both Uganda and Tanzania.

Main threats to the entire region and indeed to both Kenya and Tanzania’s ability to influence behavior of landlocked states will remain sea based. Core here is piracy threat whose estimated worth at one time was US $147 millions in ransoms. The largest ransom was US $9.5m paid in November 2010 for the release of a South Korean oil

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29 See “Mad Money rule Mogadishu”. African Business No 386 May 2012 p46
tanker Samho Dream. An average 150-200 persons were taken as hostages. The totality of cost incurred on equipment, armed guards, estimated at US $1.1bn by the Colorado-based Earth Future Foundation, US $635 m was spent on insurance, an extra US $195m was paid to crew. The lost economic opportunities aggregate the value of extraction. There are also costs being incurred in attempting to secure Somali by regional states. Security Association of Maritime Industry representing 120 armed security firms estimated gains from protection at US $52 m a month from estimated 1,500 escorted journeys across the coastline lost economic opportunities aggregates the value of extraction. There is also the trafficking of industrial products to economics in the region, organized crime such as drug and human trafficking. There are equally, threats underpinned by low capacity of the navies to have a strategic reach and sustainability to counter illegal fishing and dumping of chemicals.

Compounding the salience of the ocean are two related variables; the first is the discovery of over 50 Trillion Cubic Feet (TCF) of gas abutting Tanzania border, by Anadarko in Area 1 and ENI in Area 4, discovery of sizable deposits by British Gas and Ophir Energy backed by India steel billionaire Laksni Mittal on the Tanzanian coast, in addition to prospects of Gas and oil on the Kenya and Somali coast. Out of Kenya’s 46 blocks nine are in the deep sea. Four of these have been allocated to America’s apache company, total, Anardarko from the US and China’s National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). Ophir, Afren, Africa Oil and Premier oil have all headed towards lake Tanganyika as a new ground of exploration. Second and related to the first is the increasing salience of the East African water-front to powers with global reach seeking both access to strategic resources and the securitization of Sea lines of communications. Indian Ocean, transits 90% of the global commercial goods a factor that evolves to be either a shatter-belt or a platform for collective global stability raising further the salience of the Pivot Triangle.

For Kenya, the parallel achievement of control over land and air calls for consolidation and control over her maritime domains on land and sea. This factor is apparent in the ocean borne threats to its tourism industry and strategic assets such as oil platforms and other interconnecting architecture. The value of the Navy has been animated by three interrelated events. First is the capture of MV Faina with military hardware allegedly belonging to her Armed Forces. Second is the hostage taking of tourists from sea resorts by elements said to belong to Al Shabaab. Third, is the support roles and maritime landings provided by naval platforms that out maneuvered Al Shabaab in Kismayu. The absence of maritime security strategy coupled by the disregard of critical assets on both the continental and maritime domains currently implies that Kenya will not be in a position to guarantee her security and by inference her projection of power in the region for some foreseeable future. Part of problem can be attributed to suspicions of corruption that had constrained acquisition of a new maritime platform, obsolete assets and the loss of large numbers of trained personnel to black water company. Of late, Kenya has been undertaking efforts aimed at developing its Manda Naval base. The navy has also recently received donations of patrol boats from the US, British and French governments in addition to the acquisition of one of its naval platforms send to Spain for reconfiguration and refitting.

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30 See “Mad Money rule Mogadishu”, African Business No. 386 May 2012, p46
31 See Norbrook Nicholas: Oil and Gas Buried Treasure. The Africa report n 38 March 2012 p78
To assure her security, Kenya will have to undertake paradigm shift to anchor development, deployment and employment of its instruments of power. There will need for a dual push for a maritime security policy that mutually reinforces continental security policy. It will however be forced to build on its expeditionary capacity and capital in regional cooperation to access and maximize on ports of call in Tanzania, Mozambique, Mauritius, Seychelles and South Africa.

### 3.2 Mutating Geographies of Terrorism

Maritime threats have converged with terrorism to anchor the globalization of regionalized local spaces. The point of convergence is this has engendered arraying of two coalitions engaged in mutating conventional and asymmetrical contest. The net effect is the militarization of the horn and its extensive coastline and resultant security challenges to East African states especially Kenya and Uganda. The extent of its threat is manifested in the deployment of a division plus sized units from Uganda, Kenya and Burundi arrayed against Al Shabaab. This is increasingly becoming an existential threat and challenge to especially Kenya’s security. Key in this process is Ahmed Abdi Godane (Mukhtar Abu Zuber) led Al Shabaab and its Kenyan component known as Al Hijra. Al Shabaab affirmed its loyalty to Osama Bin Laden openly after the overthrow of the Islamic Courts, a broad coalition that brought together Al Hitihad, Al Islami and other moderate Islamists. In one of his interviews on Al Jazeera, Sheikh Muktar Robow (Abu Mansur) elaborated on operationalization of the group’s broad objective of setting up an Islamic caliphate that would stretch down to South Africa.

In his conception, Fazul, Abdullar Mohamed Al qaeda’s point man in East Africa, saw the operationalizing of this project to lay in the destabilization of Kenya given its geostrategic position in the region. Maximizing on the variables of space and time, Fazul retreated in Space to create time by embedding himself in Siyu Islands where he set himself up as an alternative to the absent Kenyan state to provision social security. Core here were, a mosque and a well to the Islands inhabitants. Fazul not only successfully embedded himself in the society, but also took advantage of this, to set up networks for his operations in Kenya and Somalia. The 1998 August 7 bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam and the 2002 twin operations at the Kenyan Coast (Kikambala hotel and an attempt to bring down an Israeli owned airline taking off from the Moi International airport).

Acting along the principle of a potato onion, Al Shabaa has evolved to converge nationalists, federalist, global jihadists and their regional components. This ensures that the more its ‘peeled’ off by pressure, the more it purifies itself. The group has enhanced the recruitment of youth from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. In Kenya, the recruitment has been facilitated under the banner of Muslim Youth Center (MYC) in Pumwani. The Kenyan branch assumed the name Al Hijra under the leadership of Sheikh Ahmed Imam Ali. Among its top leadership are Maalim Abass Guyo, Ahmed Imam Ali, and Jan Mohamed Khan (Abu Musab Al Mombasa). These set of leaders soon reconstituted cells in Kenya from their initial forward bases in North Eastern to Mombasa and Nairobi. What is notable is the fact that within a year, the North Eastern province has evolved into a favorable space of Al Shabaab asymmetrical war.

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34 He graduated from Jomo Kenyatta University of Science and Technology a degree in engineering.
Al Shabaab and its local affiliate have continued to build on this, to consolidate a favorable space. This anchors cost and utility rationality seesaw that mediates Al Shabaab’s selection of targets and decision to strike. Costs in space are conceived in terms of net cost of mitigations to constraints that militate against their intended actions in a geographical space including their efforts to enhance constraints to government security activities. Constraints here include square mileage of the geographical space plus obstacles plus sanctuaries, plus information, communication, technology and transport. Obstacles include both natural and manmade features that have the ability to slow down, impede, divert or stop movement. Four clusters are apparent; Physical geography/topography, demography, infrastructure and weather. In North Eastern Kenya, the physical geography characteristics include, the vegetation that allows concealment of agents and cache of arms. The province’s geopolitical positioning, close to collapsed state of Somalia, the Middle East and Afghanistan, allows it to converge and broadcast the reality of the ongoing asymmetrical contests between radical Islamists and the US-led coalition. It also facilitates the nurturing of networks that allow movement of logistics and persons from across theatres of contestation in Afghanistan, Yemen and Iraq.

Constraints in the infrastructure include the nature of nomadic settlements. This advantages infiltration and concealment given the apparent social distance decay. It is the same in the demographic realm. Here, obstacles include ethnic and clan structural formation. Al Shabaab has sought to exploit identity in a bid to sharpen polarities in its favor. Exploitation of obstacle in turn, enhances sanctuaries. These can be economic, political or social. Economic sanctuaries include poverty, massive unemployment and corruption organized crime networks. Currently organized crime networks linked to Al Shabaab are involved in trafficking sugar, wildlife poaching in sanctuaries as far as Tsavo east and West, and Laikipia. Kenya lost over 152 elephants. 52 have been lost this year alone. This penetration points to the potential of Al Shabaab hurting Kenya by targeting the economic, environmental and security sectors in addition to raising capital, degenerating the probity and competence of state security agents, and eventually destabilizing the social sector.

Other factors converging to enhance Al Shabaab’s threats include poverty-driven vulnerabilities that expose citizens to inducements, regional state collapse dynamics, and proximity to the Middle East conflict epicenter at the demand side level. At the supply side level, there are factors such as the presence of a huge number of high value local and international strategic assets, failed process of security sector reforms, and identity crisis, weak criminal justice systems, political and legal vulnerabilities, elite corruption and failed ideas of state building in Kenya. Terrorist options continue to change, posing challenges to the state. The ability to dissipate, maximizing on time in terrain gives those planning terror acts initiative. The innovativeness of these groups including the adaptation of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), which allows them to sustain themselves by using available political, economic, social and military networks to convince decision makers that their strategic goals are unattainable or too costly for the preset benefits. The assumption here is that superior political will prevails when employed despite economic and military balance in favor of a conventional actor.

35 Adopted From Hanrahan
Al Shabaab has exploited security lapses in refugee camps to set up structures that enable its agents to cross in. It also uses the same to bring and cache arms besides raising capital through human trafficking. An enabling factor here is corruption in Kenyan security organs especially immigration, border, customs and traffic police agents. Having created Al Hijra as its Kenyan affiliate, recruited and trained fighters from across Kenya’s ethnic groups, Al Shabaab has increased its ability to operate in Kenya. It has and continues to set up cells across towns in Maua, Migori, Eldoret and Kitale. Cell structures are hard to locate but easy to secure when it comes to operational security. For instance, the leadership and membership of each cell has no idea about the plans of others. Each maximizes on space to create time. This is used to plan attacks. Cells are in effect section equivalent in conventional terms. Their training begins in spaces controlled by Al Shabaab and includes the ability to conceive and execute missions.

Despite dislocating Al Shabaab from Kismayu, KDF failed to prevent it from retreating into space where it was able to gain time to re-organize. Maximizing on space, the group merely shifted its Center of Gravity (COG). Over time, its twin strategy is becoming increasingly apparent. The first seeks to create a favorable military space encompassing large stretches between to include Kenyan spaces and Jubaland. This may be achieved through a wide range of attacks in Kenya that seek to create a Poly-drone. The second entails the operationalization of fourth generation warfare with an objective of making Kenya’s stay in Somalia untenable.

Under the former, Al Shabaab continues to maximize on vulnerabilities and opportunities available in space. Between November 2012 and February 2013 at least 66 attacks had been experienced leading to the death of more than 111 civilians, 21 Police and 5 soldiers had died. 488 civilians, 39 police and 9 military personnel had been injured. Many others have also been foiled. Garissa, Nairobi, Mandera and Wajir have continued to experience the worst attacks. Garissa has had 20 attacks, Nairobi 14, Mandera 13, Wajir 10, Mombasa 8 and Lamu 1. Sociological analysis of the signatures underpinning these attacks points to an organized group capable of deriving multiple strategic objects from a single tactical attack incidents have included, attacks aimed at sharpening polarities along ethnic, clan and religious divide while retaining the ability to broadly impact on economic and psychological Centers of Gravity.

It is in order for us to point to a polydrone star as new geographies with the possibilities of bringing in areas such as Nakuru, Eldoret and Kisumu. Most of these cities have been spared attacks mainly due to vigilance and quick action by some actors in internal security organs. It is also probable that Al Shabaab has opted to retreat in space to gain time to plan attacks on objects of security; individuals, identity groups, strategic high value assets-oil tanks, water dams with the objectives being widened disruption at a strategic level. The attacks seek to widen geographies of disorder that would facilitate training - “wearing down the enemy’s morale at the level of intangible Centre of Gravity” in addition to engendering the dislocation of KDF from Somalia. If this has to be achieved directly, through the strategy of manoeuvre and surprise, Al Shabaab seeks to disperse KDF. If KDF’s strength is dependent on stability “equilibrium” of control, morale and supply, its dislocation through psychological and physical imbalance it sees

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39 In 2012, Al Shabaab Agents with hand Grenades were arrested in Nakuru Show ground. Another was arrested in an attempt to infiltrate a military Barracks in Nakuru. Another agent was arrested in Kitale with hand Grenades. In August 2013 , Several agents on a mission to hit National Music Festivals for learning institutions. Interviews with Senior Security officers in Nairobi August 2013.
this to be achieved through a strategy that can force withdrawal. This is given the fact that the battle between KDF and Al Shabaab, revolves around the political mind (will), which manifests itself through resistance (resolve). The drive of Al Shabaab remains that of minimizing it and to wear it down to the point that the will of the government is undermined by lack of support from Intangible Centre of Gravity - popular support.

Our contention here is that Al Shabaab seeks to play on the variable of time and exploitation of vulnerabilities in space in a bid to gain initiative. To engender dislocation, and its subsequent exploitation, Al Shabaab will continue to maximize on manoeuvre and surprise by adjusting their means from conventional engagements to terror acts while adopting their plans to circumstances. Here, space is critical. Ideally expanding it to include the Polydrone in addition to Jubaland is ideal. It is apparent that Al Shabaab seeks to graduate its aim by going for soft targets with the objective of polarizing the society. This does not preclude plans for spectacular ones such as, blowing up of dams and energy installations, - the aim being the exploitation of lines of least resistance. Moves against such strategic economic targets that are also a source of supply will seek to undermine the will of the state to induce collapse and dislocation.

In focusing on a population, it is hoped that the will of the government will be worn down raising pressure for the military to be overstretched. To the extent to which threats on economic assets and spaces as referent objects of security is increased, the basic argument for which KDF incursion in Somalia was predicated will be increasingly brought into question. Pressure to secure this and the population as referent objects of security should force dislocation and eventual exploitation. Given the fear to secure this, the time dimensions compressed on the side of the Kenyan government and gained by Al Shabaab should allow consolidation of a larger space in North Eastern province, Nairobi and eventually Mombasa providing manoeuvre through exploitation of terrain.

Defeat of KDF in Jubaland constitutes the second. This does not have to involve frontal engagements but rather pointed tactical actions across a wide range of sectors that are mutually reinforcing but which also retain strategic implications. The broad strategy here is focused on the struggle for hearts and minds of not only the Somalis, but also Kenyans and the global populace. Increased attacks seek to confine Kenya in Kismayu. The group’s increasing capacity to forge a global joint operation is apparent in its ability to mount local operations as diversions to a broad operation pulling together local, regional and global resources. The groups operations in Nairobi’s west gate mall on 21st September 2013 and its follow up operations in Mandera. The planning of the attacks are said to have began 9 months with the hiring of a shop in the Mall. This was followed by the use of the same as a platform as a forward operational base (FOBA) to cache their weapons and ammunition. The response to the hostage taking exposed the crisis of Coordination, Command and Control and the share absence of standard operating procedures that are supposed to mediate military internal securitization roles. Consequently, the operation was exposed to a cock-up as the Military units forced the General Service Unit that was in place that had in effect pined down the terrorists out. This gave the terrorist critical time to re-organize and take up strategic firing points that would prove costly to the military in terms of casualties. The aftermath looting blamed on the military points to an underlying crisis. This has helped reinforce the narrative accusing the Force of being involved in charcoal trade in Kismayu.

40 Interviews with Senior Security Officials 25th September 2013. See also The Star : Attackers May have Set up shop at Westgate Mall
This was followed by another operation by 20 Al Shabaab agents that killed three police officers while destroying government vehicles in Mandera. According to intelligence sources, 20 Al Shabaab agents entered Kenya between 5th and 10th of September to carry out assassinations. Known as head breakers or Mandax Jibishe and under Salaad Hassan and Khadar Abdi Abubakar, the group’s instructions were to assassinate individuals in Nairobi and Mombasa. Amniyat (Al Shabaab’s intelligence network in Kenya and Somalia)\(^\text{41}\) has increased its activities across the state to as far as Kitale, Maralal, Isiolo, Mumias, Maua, Migori, Kisii, Oyugis, Kiambu and Busia. In Nairobi cell members have set up bases in Githurai, Dandora and Majengo while in Mombasa these are reported in Ukunda, Kisauni, and Likoni. Their activation into action has the ability of carrying out strategic strikes with implications across multiple sectors of security. This ability will continue to grow to the extent that political elite does not initiate a paradigm shift in the management of security institutions to also include citizen involvement.

4 – Some Recapitulations

Rwanda’s conception of security to include five sectors and its focus on the individual and state has a potential of muting historical identity crisis, thus giving it flexibility of defense resources. While it shares the variable of political will with Uganda manifested by the latter’s pledge and commitment to contribute to Africa’s rapid deployment force, Uganda will increasingly get challenged by the increased use of the military to contain overt political activities. This is likely to increase with the perceptions that the President seeks to impose his son as his successor. The dissatisfaction and the inability to contain it is likely to also increase with corruption and increase in poverty levels especially amongst veterans. Other challenges Uganda might face which have the potential of straining the capacity of the military to provide security in the region include the mutating forms of terror groups in the region which have evolved capacity to transform local spaces by regionalizing and internationalizing them through strategic interactions with other global, regional, state and non-state actors. The challenge posed by these groups, includes their flexibility to combine terrorism and the need to hold ground like other traditional insurgency groups.

If Rwanda and Uganda are threatened by both FDLR and ADF, Uganda and Kenya continue to be threatened by the alliances between Al Shabaab and ADF. Uganda has to also reckon with the LRA at the regional level. Other dynamics include state-centric peacekeeping or peace enforcement. Potential tensions exist that could complicate the security situation. They include fault-lines such as Migingo borderline and the Kismayu-Jubaland project when it comes to Kenya Uganda–relations. There is also the Kivu Triangle, which raises possibilities of clashes involving Rwanda-Uganda and Tanzania, South Africa and DRC over groups such as FDLR and ADF.

Over time in space, military and brought security relations in the Great-lakes region and the horn of Africa will mutate animated by geo-economic dynamics. Critical here will be role of variable resource discoveries, critical strategic delivery arteries such as ports, pipelines and rails. Based on the apparent mutual insecurity dependencies and the

\(^{41}\) Sunday Nation Reporter: Assault mastermind Said to be a Kenyan, 50, associated with Qaeda Leader Fazul. Sunday Nation. September 29, 2013 p 5
current state-centric relative gain logic, these assets are likely to engender conflicts indeed introducing the era of Icarian open spaces as closed spaces emerge. Here the ability of Uganda, Rwanda, Southern Sudan and Ethiopia as revisionist states to seek to leverage water frontage status quo states possibilities of wars maximizing on land, maritime, air and to a limited extent drones is a given. Some form of arms race is already apparent among these states (see table one below). While the main driving concern for Uganda has been Khartoum and Egypt, Ethiopia’s concern has been Egypt and Eritrea. For Tanzania, the main concern has always been her northern neighbor. For Kenya unspoken concerns revolve around the intentions of the growing Ugandan military. Yet despite the comparatively huge allocations in Uganda and Kenya compared to Rwanda, apparent corruption degrades the potential impact of their forces compared to Rwanda.

The mutations regionalized global groups to create local affiliates like Al Hijra in Kenya and the ability of states in East Africa to take a region-centric perspective to reduce distance decay will remain core to its containment and management of broad security threats in the region. How these states maximize on their apparent mutual insecurity and security threats to the extend of transforming them into a platform for collective security and defense pacts is going to be fundamental in their ability to manage security threats. It will also help to sustain their expeditionary roles within the region\(^{42}\). Some form of security cooperation within multilateral settings exits. Among these is the cooperation under the East African community that allows states to access their military training institutions. Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda are active members of the Eastern African standby force. Kenya and Uganda cooperated covertly to militarily support the Southern Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) with the latter sending in combat elements. How these states align themselves to the emerging security overlays in the region will equally impact on inter-state security relations and their engagements against asymmetrical actors.

Security overlays here are driven by the geo-strategic variables resident in the pivot triangle. All the three core actors here, India, China, USA have had and indeed have military units in the Pivot Triangle. They complement actors such as France, which has retained some naval elements in the region. US has gone as far as setting up AFRICOM an exclusive Command set up to deal with threats to her strategic interests. With 85% of China’s oil passing through the Indian Ocean, via Malacca straits into the pacific, China has staged a re-entry into the Indian Ocean last seen by Admiral Zheng’s voyages in 1405-1433 forced by piracy raising concerns in India. Its apparent that China would have no interest or capacity to establish a Mahanian control over the Indian Ocean and that neither the US or India would allow her. It is logical to thus conceive of a security platform constructed around the notion of mutual threats and collective interests. Admiral Mike Mullen captured this more succinctly in 2006 while chief of naval operations when he noted. “Where the old “Maritime Strategy’ focused on sea control, the new one must recognize that the economic tide of all nations rises when the seas are controlled by one (Nation), but rather when they are made safe and free for all. Is after that proverbial 1,000-ship Navy- a Fleet in being, if you will, comprised of all freedom-loving nations standing watch over the seas, standing watch over each other?

Mullen is right, however beyond coalition of those with the capacity, such vision must be anchored on the interest of the Pivot Triangle. Hence the need for unity of purpose

for these states through transformed platforms of insecurity animated by transformed regional bodies, the IGAD, IC-GLR, EAC and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). This has to imply serious thinking of a regional navy supported by global powers. Critical here are common regional security based economic protocols rooted in collective security that ought to bind states not only in collective exploitation of resources but also in geographically defined distribution and access of critical energy enabling asset areas.
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<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Military Exp.</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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</table>

Source: Extracted from SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (1988-2012)
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