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Tanzania's Geopolitics Today

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Résumé / Abstract

Les courants géopolitiques tanzaniens évoluent, et il est important de déterminer l'influence, le rôle et la position du pays à travers les différents systèmes régionaux du continent. Afin d'y parvenir, cette note étudie la participation de la Tanzanie dans les organismes régionaux africains tels que l'EAC, la SADC ou encore le COMESA. Cette note se concentre également sur la relation entre la Tanzanie et les superpuissances mondiales, comme la Chine et les États-Unis, suite aux visites récentes de leurs Présidents respectifs en Tanzanie. Le but de cette note est de comprendre le comportement dynamique de la Tanzanie dans la mesure où elle répond aux obligations des différents organismes régionaux, et les conséquences qui en découlent sur ses échanges avec ses voisins.

Dans cette veine, la note essaye de clarifier les implications de la relation entre la Tanzanie et les puissances dominantes sur les politiques régionales. Le comportement de la Tanzanie est dicté par au moins cinq facteurs déterminants ; outre son passé et son rôle dans les guerres de libération et dans l'unification de l'Afrique, il faut également tenir compte de son inclination idéologique (particulièrement pour les mouvements socialistes et les régimes à partis uniques qui leurs sont associés), mais aussi du principe de voisinage, de la fin de la guerre froide et de la libéralisation de l'espace politique, ou encore du principe de non-alignement.

Cette note est divisée en trois parties; elle aborde premièrement une analyse des trois groupements régionaux, avec un rappel de leurs contextes historiques – afin de mieux comprendre leurs dynamiques actuelles – suivi d'une description de la relation entre la Tanzanie et les puissances dominantes, avec ses implications pour la politique régionale, et dernièrement des éléments conclusifs.

Introduction

Tanzania's geo-political trends have been changing over time. Notably one can differentiate the extent of the country's role, influence and position across regional groupings. In order to understand this state of affairs, this note revisits the involvement of Tanzania in African regional groupings such as the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Moreover, the note highlights the relation between Tanzania and the big super powers like the USA and China as exemplified in the recent visits of the heads of states of the respective countries to Tanzania. The purpose of this note is to understand the dynamic behavior of Tanzania as it responds to the obligations of each regional grouping and the implications of the same to its relation with her neighboring countries.

Similarly, the note intends to analyze the implications of Tanzania's relation with the big super powers on regional politics. There are at least five factors that inform Tanzania's dynamic behavior, including its history and role in the liberation struggle as well as the African unity; its ideological inclination, particularly towards socialism and the related authoritarian regime of the single party order; neighborhood principle; the end of cold war and liberalization politics; and the non-alignment movement.

This note proceeds as follows: the first part dwells on the three African regional groupings. It locates them in their historical context in order to understand the current dynamics. The second part covers the relation between Tanzania and the big powers and its implications on the regional politics. The last section forms the conclusion.

1 – EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY

1.1 – *The Context*

The EAC started with a construction of the Kenya Uganda railway to facilitate transportation of raw materials for the British colonial government to its overseas industries. This was followed by a series of processes culminating to the establishment of the defunct East African Community in 1967. The Preamble of the current 1999 Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (TEEAC) attests to this fact and provides for a chain of processes as follows:

the construction of the Kenya Uganda Railway 1897 - 1901, the establishment of the Customs Collection Centre 1900, the East African Currency Board 1905, the Postal Union 1905, the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa 1909, the Customs Union 1919, the East African Governors Conference 1926, the East African Income Tax Board 1940 and the Joint Economic Council 1940; the East Africa (High Commission) Orders in Council 1947 - 1961, the East African Common Services Organization Agreements 1961 – 1966, (and) the Treaty for East African Cooperation 1967 for the establishment respectively, of the East Africa High Commission, the East African Common Services Organization and the East African Community as successive joint organizations of the said countries to control and administer certain matters of common interest and to regulate the commercial and industrial relations and transactions between the said countries and by means of a central legislature to enact on behalf of the said countries laws relevant to the purposes of the said joint organizations.

The 1967 Treaty for the East African Commission was signed between the Republic of Kenya, the Republic of Uganda, and the United Republic of Tanzania respectively. This cooperation however, survived only for one decade before it collapsed in 1977 owing to a number of reasons including “lack of strong political will, lack of strong participation of the private sector and civil society in the co-operation activities, the continued disproportionate sharing of benefits of the Community among the Partner States due to their differences in their levels of development and lack of adequate policies to address this situation.”¹

On 30 November 1999, the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC was signed and the EAC was re-established on 15 January 2001 after Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda ratified the Treaty. Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty list the objectives of the Community which essentially focus to promote co-operation at the sub-regional and regional levels among the Partner States in political, economic, social and cultural fields, research and technology, defence, security and legal and judicial affairs, for their mutual benefit. The ultimate goal is to form a political federation. Article 123 Section 6 of the East African Community Treaty states that “The Summit shall initiate the process towards the Establishment of the Political Federation of the Partner States by directing the Council to undertake the process.” After reviewing integration developments in the region at a Special Summit held at the Windsor Golf and Country Club in Nairobi on 27-29 August 2004, President Kibaki, President Museveni and President Mkapa expressed concern at the slow pace of integration and hence resolved to accelerate the process of integration so that the ultimate goal of a political federation is achieved through a fast track mechanism.

The traditional members of the EAC Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda were joined by Rwanda and Burundi in 2007 making a total of five member states for the EAC. This addition though welcomed, has also added challenges in the implementation of the integration processes; among others are political instability in some member states such as Uganda and now Rwanda and Burundi, lack of clarity on the process leading to integration, structural and institutional obstacles such as protectionism by member states on the movement of capital, goods, and people.² In its team of experts report, the EAC identifies political, legal, economic, and socio-cultural fears, concerns and challenges towards the federation. A few deserve a mention namely fear of losing national sovereignty, loss of competition over land, loss of economic opportunities and employment.³

1.2 – Exclusion of Tanzania and Burundi in EAC Related Meetings

Tanzania regards itself as one of the loyal members of the EAC. It has been a core member state of the defunct EAC of 1967-1977 and the current EAC. However, of recent, Tanzania has been sidelined by the three member states namely Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda. The three have held series of meetings without the involvement of Tanzania and Burundi. The first was held between 24 and 25 June, 2013 in Entebbe, Uganda; the second was on 28 August, 2013 in Mombasa Kenya, and the third was held on 28 October, 2013 in Kigali Rwanda. In these meetings, Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda agreed on a number of issues including the Single Customs Territory and Fast Tracking of the East African

¹ See the Preamble of the 1999 Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community.

² Mohabe Nyirabu (2011) “The Past, Present and Future of Integration in East Africa”, *African Integration Review*, 5 (1): 1-31.

³ EAC (2011): Report of the Team of Experts on Addressing the Fears, Concerns and Challenges of the East Africa Federation, East African Community.

Political Federation. This joint co-operation of the three countries renamed itself as the “*Coalition of the willing*”. Expressing his sentiments on the move by the three member states, Hon. Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, the president of Tanzania remarked:-

Truly, I ask myself many questions without answers as to what is being done by our fellow leaders of the three states and why? Is it that our colleagues have no confidence on the EAC and hence establish their own? Or do they hate our country and so they want to provoke us to disintegrate? I would want to assure you that we have no plans to do that.”⁴

President Kikwete held further that, “our colleagues argue that they did so because they think they are ready. But who is not ready? Did they invite us in the first place? We believe that this argument is baseless.”⁵ The move by the three member states can also be attributed to the long standing feelings that Tanzania has been an obstacle to the fast tracking process of the political federation. This is due to its position on the pace towards the federation. Presenting Tanzania’s position on this, President Kikwete maintains that “There has been allegations by some of our colleagues that Tanzania has no good intentions for the furtherance and strengthening of the EAC and that we have been the obstacle to the fast trackers. They argue that if it were not for Tanzania, the EAC would have been far by now.”⁶

Just like its first president Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere who argued for a step by step process towards the African Union, President Kikwete categorically follows Mwalimu’s footsteps. His stand and that of Tanzanians is that the process of forming a political federation has to be a step by step just as is provided by the Treaty establishing the EAC. No single step has to be overlooked. He is particularly emphatic on the strengthening of the economic cooperation through Customs Union, Common Market, and Monetary Union before the political federation is envisaged. It is by so doing that the federation would have a strong foundation. The United Republic of Tanzania New Foreign policy recognizes that the countries of the East African Community have a unique relationship arising from culture, history, geography and human contact. Due to the socio-economic importance of this Region, the United Republic of Tanzania shall strive to support efforts aimed at harmonization and convergence of social, political and economic policies with a view to transforming EAC into Customs Union, a Common Market, subsequently a Monetary Union and ultimately a Political Federation. Hence, it is the policy of Tanzania to support gradualism when it comes to regional integration.

Oddly, the President of the Republic of Kenya Hon. Uhuru Kenyatta in his recent speech of 25 March 2014 to the East African Legislative Assembly in Arusha, noted economic challenges among member states as one of the stumbling blocks to the achievement of the political federation. He stated that integration is a process and not an event.⁷ This view of gradual integration starting with the economic integration before the political federation was held by the Wako Committee of 2004 when it stated “The underlying fact is that effective economic integration within a Political Federation is an imperative. Indeed, an economically successful East African Federation would set the tempo and

⁴ United Republic of Tanzania (2013) Presidential Speech to the National Assembly, 7 November 2013.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ East African Legislative Assembly, Arusha, Tanzania March 25, 2014: President Uhuru Kenyatta today delivered the State of EAC Address at a Special Sitting at the EALA Chambers in Arusha, Tanzania.

become a role model for the rest of Africa, where integration has been slow to realize.”⁸ In its research on the fast-tracking the federation, the Committee found that 74.4% of respondents were not in favour of the fast-tracking of political integration, but only 25.5% wanted the political federation fast tracked. Yet, of the five EAC partner states, Tanzania scored the lowest in the level of support of integration by 57%.⁹ Debating the 2005/2006 budget for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, some MPs categorically expressed their position. Hon. Hamad Rashid Hamad, an MP from Civic United Front (CUF) advised the government to be careful on the move to political federation because of some political developments in Uganda i.e. changing the constitution allowing Museveni to run for a third term. Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) MP Hon. Rhoda Kahatano warned that political federation should wait as there was no need for rushing.¹⁰ In his paper “*Demystification of Political Integration–The Case of East Africa*”, Prof. Gilbert Khadiagala concludes that gradualism is a relevant approach.¹¹ Indeed, Khadiagala sees economic integration as a building block for political federation. However other analysts hold a rather different view by stressing that “The experience that East Africans have had since 1963 when then Heads of State called for an East African federation is apparent that placing economic considerations at the front of political unity as a foundation for an ultimate federation has not been achieved. In other words, the resolution to federate must be a political decision and not an economic decision.”¹²

1.3 – The “Cold War” between Tanzania and Rwanda

One of the recent developments in the EAC is the deterioration of the relation between Tanzania and Rwanda. Indeed, the two countries are undergoing what might be called as the “Cold War”. There have been underground allegations from each side for interfering diplomatic affairs of the other. In August 2013 the president of Tanzania ordered the expulsion of 6,600 illegal migrants and criminals of which about 4000 were returned back to Rwanda. This operation was done amid heightening diplomatic tension with the Rwandan government over the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.¹³ It is reported that “Tanzania fears that Rwanda might try to destabilise it, in retaliation for its decision to send troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo as part of the UN force seeking to disarm and neutralise the M23 rebel group. The M23 is widely seen as a proxy of Rwanda, though the government in Kigali denies it is backing the group or is seeking conflict with Tanzania.”¹⁴ Due to the above situation, the two heads of states have exchanged acrimonious words indirectly on different occasions. In his November, 2013 Speech with the Members of Parliament, President Kikwete congratulated the president of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Joseph Kabila for a historical success against the M23. The DRC has experienced conflict since independence in 1960. The conflict has come to be called Africa’s world war. This is because millions of people died between 1998 and 2003. The war involved about five countries. These were Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, which supported Joseph Kabila’s government, while Uganda

⁸ EAC (2004): Report of the committee on fast tracking East African federation. The report is popularly known as “Wako Committee.”

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ United Republic of Tanzania (2005): Parliamentary Debate on the 2005/2006 National Budget, Dodoma, Hansard.

¹¹ EAC Summary of deliberations of the 2nd EAC Dialogue on Political Integration: Exploring the relationship between Political and Economic Integration Kunduchi Beach Hotel – Dar es Salaam 18th - 19th April 2012.

¹² Nyirabu, (2011).

¹³ *BBC Africa*, 2 September 2013.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

and Rwanda allegedly supported the rebel groups. Although Kagame's government rejects the allegation that it supported the rebel groups, the official UN reports on Congolese War confirm its involvement.¹⁵ By sending its 1,800 out of 3000 troops under UN Brigades, Tanzania joins the other three states in support of the Congolese government. The M23 is said to consist of Tutsi ethnic group which explains the Rwandan government's support for it.¹⁶ In his speech to the Great Lakes Region meeting in 2013, President Kikwete advised the governments of Rwanda and Uganda to negotiate with the rebel groups in conflict with them. In response to Kikwete's advice, Kagame dismissed it as "utter nonsense" while Museveni argued that he negotiates only with the willing and isolates the others.¹⁷ As response to Rwanda's government, Tanzania's President Jakaya Kikwete raised eyebrows on 25 July when he warned that "anyone who dares invade or provoke us will face dire consequences."¹⁸ This "Cold war" between Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania is allegedly advanced as an explanation why Tanzania was excluded in recent meetings of the EAC member states of Uganda, Rwanda, and Kenya.

1.4 – Security Arrangements and Co-Operation in EAC

There are joint military exercises held among the EAC member states to prepare for counter terrorism, and natural disasters and humanitarian crises. There is a security mechanism in Eastern Africa names East African standby Force EASF whereas Kenya, Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda are members, but Tanzania only is not a member of EASF and member of the SADC STANDBY Force. This has continued to be seen that Tanzania is not interested to co-operate with the EAC countries. For instance in search for peace in Somalia which is also a member of EASF, Uganda, Burundi, and Kenya have sent troops to the African Mission in Somalia-AMISOM, there are blames that Tanzania is not cooperative but the truth is that Tanzania was the forced to offer the opportunity for Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, to train 1000 military in Tanzania, and go back to build a national army. However due to increased Islamist extremism in eastern Africa and Tanzania and the intelligence information did not recommend Tanzania to continue with the plan or send troops due to the fact that Tanzania has the largest number of Muslims in eastern Africa as the AMISOM mission is peace enforcement category that would breed more anger among the islamists in Tanzania. The troops contributing countries are getting capacity support from the USA AFRICOM – African Contingent Training Assistance ACOTA in which Tanzania see it as a USA initiative that aims to deal with USA security interest in eastern Africa to combat terrorism rather than peacekeeping operation per se.

¹⁵ UN Report 2003.

¹⁶ *BBC Africa*, 31 July 2013.

¹⁷ *The East African* 10 June 2013.

¹⁸ *BBC Africa*, 31 July 2013.

2 – SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY

2.1 – *The Context*

Tanzania's regional cooperation does not end in the EAC. It also involves its membership to other regional organisations like the SADC. SADC¹⁹ originated from the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)²⁰ which was established in 1980 in terms of the "Lusaka Declaration: Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation." SADCC was, in essence, a politically motivated response and "defensive mechanism" by the Front line States (FLS) to the PW Botha government in South Africa's idea of a "constellation of states" in the region. Hence, it was first and foremost the brainchild of the leaders of the Front Line States who established it as the "economic pillar" of the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle in the region. Tanzania had been part of the FLS since its inception. It harboured the South African-ANC dissidents for many years and had generally been very active in the liberation struggle waged against the white regimes in (then) Rhodesia and South Africa.

It has to be noted that Tanzania is the only EAC member that is also in SADC. Some commentators feel that if Tanzania chooses SADC permanently, the idea of the EAC and its Customs Union could be fatally undermined. It is on that ground that Uganda and Kenya have allegedly been putting great pressure on Tanzania to stay out of SADC in the long term.²¹ Nevertheless, Tanzania set up a Presidential Economic Commission with South Africa in 2005. Such an agreement has only previously been signed with two other countries: Mozambique and Namibia. This may be evidence that South African foreign policy views Tanzania as a key African neighbour, rather than a distant trade partner. This would lend weight to arguments that South Africa would resist efforts by COMESA to lure Tanzania back.²²

Traditionally, the Kenyan economy has outstripped that of Tanzania, making Kenya the biggest economy in East Africa. But a SADC membership offers Tanzania more development funding, and seemingly the chance of countering Kenya's historical regional economic domination through a closer political and economic relationship with South Africa.²³ As a result Tanzania may be retaining its relationship with South Africa, via SADC, to protect itself from the possibility of an even more economically resurgent and overly "dominant" Kenya. This therefore may be one of the biggest reasons for Tanzania's ongoing commitment to SADC.

Yet, Tanzania's position in the SADC is strengthened by the fact that through the liberation struggles, of which Tanzania became instrumental in the Southern and Central Africa, gave the ruling party in Tanzania, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) an opportunity to forge political ties with the ruling parties in almost all of the SADC member states. They call themselves "comrades". This has given SADC chances to widen and deepen its political ties as opposed to EAC and COMESA. It should be noted that in Kenya and Uganda there are no political parties comparable to those of the "comrades". In his speech in South Africa, President Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania described the role played by the

¹⁹ Since 1993

²⁰ 1980-1993

²¹ Wolfe Braude (2008) SADC, COMESA AND THE EAC: Conflicting regional and trade agendas, Institute for Global Dialogue, Occasional Paper No 57.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

nationalist parties. He named nationalist parties of TANU (Tanganyika), ZANU,PF (Zimbabwe), FRELIMO (Mozambique), ANC (South Africa) and SWAPO (Namibia) as comrades. Left behind were KANU of Kenya and other political parties in the East African countries. This state of affairs is allegedly said to have been negatively interpreted. In Kenya for example, it is argued that Kikwete's speech shamed the KANU under Kenyatta regime. It is accused of refusing to host the ANC to set base in Kenya.²⁴ By being a member of SADC, Tanzania is seen to be a slow mover in the federation process. This fact has led other member states of the EAC to see Tanzania as having no good intentions with the EAC. It was complicated by the decision by Tanzania to denounce its membership with COMESA to which it should "rightfully" belong. Moreover, as explained in section (1.1.3 of this paper) Tanzania's involvement in the DRC conflict has also been negatively perceived by some members of the EAC.

The Tanzania's new foreign policy recognizes shared with the SADC countries bonds of political solidarity and common history of struggle against colonialism and apartheid, in addition to having similar natural resources and wealth in abundance. Tanzania takes advantage of complementarily that exists within the community to promote its industry, trade, and scientific knowledge as well as to attract investment in the country. In support and promote ideals of SADC, including those of peace, democracy, human rights, defense and security cooperation in full recognition that political stability in the region shall inspire investment confidence and other envelopment endeavors. Tanzania has contributed much in different SADC arrangements including the SADC stand by Force whose troops have been deployed to the UN intervention force in the DRC.

Tanzania participation could mean to fit her new foreign policy on economic diplomacy by mainstreaming economic issues to the extent that even political commitments such as conflict resolution; promotion of human rights and others, shall be received as permitting conducive (attractive) environment for economic co-operation and development. The DRC uses Dar es Salaam port for import and export of goods and so by stabilizing the Eastern DRC who mean sustainable business with Tanzania and may not necessarily hinder Uganda or Rwanda business in Eastern DRC.

2.2 – Border Conflicts

Tanzania still faces border conflict challenges with the neighbors particularly Malawi over Lake Nyasa and Seychelles, and the Comoros and Mozambique. The Malawi and Tanzania border is under mediation by SADC mediator, on the other hand the Tanzania African Union has facilitated signing by Seychelles, the Comoros and Tanzania of agreements on the delimitation of their maritime borders Addis Ababa, 18 February 2012. On 17 February 2012, in Victoria, Seychelles, and as part of the implementation of the African Union border Programme (AUBP), the governments of the Comoros, the Seychelles and Tanzania signed Agreements on the delimitation of their maritime borders. These include: an Agreement on the delimitation of the maritime border between the Republic of Seychelles and the Union of the Comoros; and an Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles, the Union of the Comoros and the United Republic of Tanzania on the Indian Ocean triple point.

²⁴ Kenya Today 15 December 2013.

3 – COMMON MARKET FOR EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was founded in 1993 as a successor to the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA), which was established in 1981. COMESA formally succeeded the PTA on 8 December 1994. It is important to note that all member states of the EAC with the exception of Tanzania are also members of COMESA. Tanzania announced its intention to withdraw from COMESA in July 1999, citing the proposals by COMESA to reduce customs tariffs by 90% as its reason for withdrawing. Tanzania's tariff rate would have been expected to drop to 4% from the current 7% average for COMESA members. It also argued that since it is a member of both SADC and EAC, its withdrawal from COMESA would give it more time to concentrate on these two regional groupings. According to the then President of Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa the main reason for pulling out of COMESA was based on the fact that Tanzania was already a member of too many regional trading organizations. The sum effect of this meant membership to such an arrangements was extremely costly to sustain. He maintained that there was no need for economic integration for the sake of being seen to work together while the integration does not make economic sense. This ground has been held by scholars as they posit that overlapping memberships between the various regional arrangements have costs. Negotiating resources and capacity have been stretched thin across the region. There are administrative costs related to often complex rules of origin. Multiple membership fees are expensive to pay and maintain. Conflicting objectives among rival arrangements have contributed to a lack of progress in many areas.²⁵ As several of these arrangements are in various stages of forming customs unions (COMESA, SADC, and the EAC), it has become clear that conflicts of membership need to be resolved, but this may prove politically difficult.²⁶

4 – TANZANIA AND THE WORLD

The relation between Tanzania and the rest of the world has significant implications in the way it is perceived by its EAC member states. Tanzania relates very well with the rest of the world. Whether this relation has positive impact on the country is beyond the analysis of this note. Suffice to say that recent developments prove a close link between Tanzania and the two world's strongest economies of the USA and China. The fact that Africa in general and Tanzania in particular are seen as important centres for investment and trade by developed economies is a real one. Likewise, the fact that African countries depend on these countries for aid and investment opportunities cannot be overstated. Hence, the visits by the Heads of states of these big economies to Tanzania were perceived by other EAC members as an advantage on the part of Tanzania. The strong cooperation between Tanzania with these two important states of the world is the manifestation of the position of the country in the international community. Recently, Tanzania has also been enjoying strong diplomatic relations with the USA. Yet, another fact is that the government of Tanzania generally has a favourable attitude toward foreign

²⁵ Mareike Meyn (2005) The Progress of Economic Regionalisation in Southern Africa –Challenges for SADC and COMESA, NEPRU Yearbook Volume No. 5.

²⁶ Padamja Khandelwal (2004) COMESA and SADC: Prospects and Challenges for Regional Trade Integration, IMF Working Paper, Policy Development and Review Department, 2004 International Monetary Fund WP/04/227

direct investment (FDI) and has had considerable success in attracting FDI. In 2012, FDI into Tanzania rose to over USD 1.1 billion, the highest in East Africa.²⁷

4.1 – American – Tanzanian Relations

Notwithstanding, the relations were not such strong during the Cold war. The reason for such state of affairs was the differences in the views of Tanzania and that of the USA. On the one hand, Tanzania was committed to anti-colonial and imperialist struggles in Southern Africa and the rest of the world. On the other hand, USA was concerned with the protection of its markets and economic interests in the continent regardless of the fact that such interests were involving colonial regimes, such as the Apartheid regime of South Africa, that Tanzania was struggling to remove from power. However, after the Cold war the cooperation between the two states started to strengthen. For instance in the education sector, the USA sent her volunteers through Peace Corps to work in different parts of Tanzania as teachers and instructors in order to solve the problem of shortages of human resources in education sector. The diplomatic relations among two countries was further entrenched with the Tanzania moves to liberalization in late 1980s.²⁸

Despite frustrations, the American government persists in their attempts to make friends in Tanzania, utilizing the grab bag of programs and assistance like African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and the Millennium Challenge Account designed in Washington for countries with more established market economies like Mauritius, South Africa, Swaziland, and Ghana. Yet, the USAID budget for Tanzania itself is consistently less than \$30 million per year, with much of the assistance going to American NGOs and companies to promote small business development. A focus on national parks and conservation fills out the short list of programs coordinated by USAID and the US Embassy during the last five years. Newer programs for the treatment of HIV/AIDS are also being established in the context of the President Bush's 2003 Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief programs.

American vision for Tanzanian relations has been obscured by its own pre-occupation with the 2001 attacks by Al Qaeda. As a result, the Americans have an overwhelming interest in security issues, which while dominant for the Americans, are irrelevant to the mass of poor rural Tanzanians. In response to the 1998 embassy bombing in Tanzania, between 1999 and 2003 the United States has spent about \$100 million for a new twenty-two acre embassy complex, airport security, FBI investigations, armored vehicles, construction of diplomatic facilities, and rehabilitation of Embassy staff housing.

Moreover, USA provides aid and support in a number of ways to support the economy as well as the provision of social services. Her role has been important in health, good governance, water, business and infrastructure development. The importance of Tanzania diplomatic relations with USA has been a reason to the visit by the America heads of the state and leaders. The first visit was by George Bush in 2008 and later by Barrack Obama in 2013.²⁹ These visits apart from enunciating the image of Tanzania in the international community, they were also accompanied with a number of economic cooperation deals.

²⁷ 2013 Investment Climate Statement, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs

²⁸ Waters, T (2006) "Markets and Morality: America's Relations with Tanzania", *African Studies Quarterly*, 8(3): 46-53.

²⁹ It has to be noted that prior to the visit to Tanzania by President Obama, President Kikwete was the first President to visit President Obama when he was sworn in as the US President in 2009.

On the other hand, the cooperation between these two states has moved further to include important nongovernmental institutions from USA. In 2007, for example, Tanzania hosted the Sullivan Summit. This is the summit for black people who are living in the Diaspora, especially USA, which is focused on creating economic relations with Africans so as to speed development of all people of African origin. Unlike previously, where American companies were hesitant in investing in Tanzania, now that trend has been changing as a number of companies from USA have found their way into Tanzania. The areas of investment have been in the energy sector. For instance the Symbion Power which is one among the biggest energy producing company in USA has entered in energy production sector and its activities are expected to grow. Furthermore the cooperation between Tanzania and USA has been in areas of security and peace. It is on this ground that USA trained the Tanzania's troops who were later sent to Lebanon for peace keeping mission in 2007.

4.2 – China-Tanzania Relations

The relations between China and Tanzania can be traced from the time of independence. China established diplomatic relations with Tanganyika and Zanzibar on 9 December 1961 and 10 December 1963 respectively. When the United Republic of Tanzania was formed China continued to have ties with the country. Despite of being the developing country, during the Cold war era, China cooperation with Africa was very crucial and remarkable. China was sympathetic to decolonization struggles over the continent. It was involved in helping liberation movements through providing direct monetary and military aid to the African states.³⁰ This goal coincided with Tanzania commitment to decolonization of Africa. It was on this spirit that China built Tanzania and Zambia Railway (TAZARA) which cost US\$600 million and it involved the help of 15,000 Chinese workers.³¹ The project was important in three ways. First it cemented the liberation struggles as Zambia was able to effectively impose the sanctions against the South Rhodesia and South Africa colonial governments as she had the means to transport her commodities especially copper through Dar es Salaam port. Moreover, it facilitated the transportation of liberation fighters from Tanzania to Zambia where they could depart to the countries of their destination. Second, the railway fuelled economic importance of Dar es Salaam port as it now became a route for the transportation of imports and exports from the land locked countries of Malawi and Zambia. This economic impact was also felt in the southern regions of Tanzania which are agricultural productive as they were exposed to the market. Third, the railway formed an important part of social service to the people from South Western parts of the country such as Mbeya and Iringa.

Moreover, China built the *Urafiki* Textile factory in Tanzania. The factory was built without any conditionality as it was a part expression of her diplomatic friendship with Tanzania.³² Such relations among these two countries have continued to flourish as Chinese have been one among the leading investors in Tanzania. Their companies are involved in a number of infrastructure development projects in Tanzania. Apart from that, China has also constructed the only modern stadium in Tanzania which was handed over in 2010. Moreover, the two heads of China have visited Tanzania. These are Hu Jintao, in 2008 and Xi Jinping in 2013, whose visit was immediate after coming into power. Just

³⁰Zafar, A. (2007) "The Growing Relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic, Trade, Investment, and Aid Links". The World Bank, Oxford University Press.

³¹ Taylor, I. (2009) *China's New Role in Africa*; Lynne Leiner Publishers, Boulder, USA.

³² Muekalia, D. (2004) "Africa and China's Strategic Partnership", *African Security Review*13 (1): 5- 11.

like in other parts of the world, the overwhelming diplomatic relations between Tanzania and China is built on Tanzania possession of strategic commodities such as forestry resources, minerals and the prospect to oil and gas.³³ It is on this basis that China has financed a gas pipeline construction project from Mtwara to Dar es Salaam. Also the two countries have signed a contract for the construction of Bagamoyo port which will be the largest port in East Africa. Set to be the largest and most modern port in Africa, the harbor is expected to be in operation by 2017. It will handle 20 times more cargo than the Dar es Salaam Port, which is Tanzania's current major import and export gateway in East Africa. Open Data for International Development (AidData) also shows that Beijing has emerged as Tanzania's single biggest trading partner in 2012, accounting for 15 per cent of Dar es Salaam's trade. Latterly, China and Tanzania have taken on up to 19 projects worth billions of dollars. Some of these projects have been financially backed by the Chinese state-owned Exim Bank to the tune of \$10 billion. The involvement of China in Tanzania as well as their overwhelming diplomatic relations is the sign of the importance of Tanzania in the international community. This is due to the fact that, having strong relations with world leading manufacturing and second economic power positions Tanzania into the highest level in the world.

CONCLUSION

This note has shown Tanzania's geopolitics in the regional organisations such as the EAC, SADC and COMESA. One is its slowness in regard to the fast-tracking process of the EAC. This is seen from its foreign policy, national leaders and the common people. There is a worry that Tanzania's land, employment opportunities, and sovereignty will be at stake. Thus, it is in the hope of the country that if the process is taken carefully and slowly some of these worries might be dealt with accordingly. Another reason that put Tanzania in debatable position is its relation with other regional and global organisation such SADC and then COMESA. Tanzania is the only member from the EAC who is also a member of SADC. The rest of members namely Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi belong to the COMESA. Overlapping membership has been one of the barriers towards successful integrations in Africa since it is costly and at times policies and objectives of regional groupings conflict. For example, Tanzania has deployed some troops under the auspices of SADC and UN to stabilise the DRC. However this attempt has not been welcomed by some EAC members like Uganda and Rwanda who seem to have stake in DRC. Yet, Tanzania's relation with the big economic powers especially China and the USA has strengthened such that other members of the EAC would find its international and economic profiles shine.

³³ Kaplinsky, R. and Morris, M. (2009) "Chinese FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa: Engaging with Large Dragons", *European Journal of Development Research*, 21(4): 551–569.

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